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Abstract 
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Offshoring is an option when an organization decides to ‘hire-out’ services traditionally done ‘in-
house’ to a firm in another country mainly driven by the business effort to reduce cost and increase 
the availability of skills and talent. One of the factors that enables the use of offshoring within this IT 
service area is the availability of electronic capabilities to share information despite the geographical 
proximity gap between the parties involved in the offshoring activities. 
Asset specificity is one of the characteristic of the transaction cost of an offshore contract which 
describes the size of the opportunity losses that will be incurred in case of termination before 
completion of a contract. One other characteristic of the transaction cost of an offshore contract is 
uncertainty which refers to the degree of which parties can specify the intended performance and 
predict impact from environmental factors in the execution of a contract. It was found that the asset 
specificity levels within the IT service area will have a potential impact on the offshore risks and 
require specific management control elements to reduce the risk for this type of activities. 
Uncertainty can be seen as another of the factors influencing potential offshore risks. Management 
will take mitigating measures within their organization as a result of offshore risk caused by 
uncertainty. 
Offshoring relationships can cause operational and strategic risks which will prevent organizations 
from achieving their short-term and long term objectives. Offshore relationships can be impacted by 
a wide variety of risks. In order to determine the list of risks a list of factors leading to the risks have 
been established. 
In this paper I have investigated how offshore relationship risks can be controlled by building a model 
of the management control structure of inter organizational relationships and indicate which factors 
influence the choice of the management control structure used within the IT services area.  
The high level conclusion is that the outsourcer has high potential for the offshore risks of switching 
costs and costly contractual IT services area. The risk of switching cost as result of premature 
termination of offshore contracts and the risk of costly contract which can cause changes of the 
desired offshore contract. The high risk of switching cost and costly contractual have been 
recognized as part of this thesis by the outsourcer organization and result, action and cultural 
controls are in use to reduce the risks. Beside these listed controls the outsourcer is also applying 
governance control such as the availability of two suppliers and mix of outsourcer resources and 
supplier resources to further reduce the impact of these risks.  
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1 Introduction 
This paper contains my case study research as part of the Open Universiteit master thesis theme 
Management Control of Strategy Relationship between Organizations. This chapter is organized as 
follows. The chapter starts with a global description of the subject following with a research model 
concept. The chapter will end with information regarding the research question and sub questions. 
1.1 Subject 
Inter organizational relationships (IORs) are more and more used to increase organizational 
competitiveness. This is based on partnership instead of ownership. The relationship will provide the 
partners access to skills and competences lacking in their own organization in order to remain 
competitive within their market. The IORs exist in multiple form such as, alliances, joint ventures, 
supply management, licensing, co-branding, franchising, cross-sector partnerships, networks, trade 
associations and consortia as shown in the theory from Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos (2011). 
Key terms in performing work of the principle organization outside the physical location of the 
company are outsourcing, offshoring and offshore outsourcing as defined by Stack and Downing 
(2005). In this paper we will use the term offshoring based on the offshore outsourcing definition, “a 
company decides to ‘hire-out’ jobs traditionally done ‘in-house’ to a firm in another country in which 
the hiring company has no direct ownership and over which the company has no direct authority or 
control”, (Stack & Downing, 2005, p. 515). 
Hahn, Bunyaratavej, and Doh (2011) discusses that the business effort to reduce cost and increase 
the availability of skills and talent can be seen as the main drivers for offshoring professional and 
information services. It is no longer required to carry out the professional and information services in 
the locations close to the customer. One of the factors that enables the use of offshoring within this 
IT service area is the availability of electronic capabilities to share information despite the 
geographical proximity gap between the parties involved in the offshoring activities. Other areas that 
will have influence on the decision to offshore activities are lower wages, availability of skills, cultural 
distance, risks and productivity issues as highlighted in the theory of Hahn et al. (2011). 
Offshoring of professional and information services activities range from fee-for service 
arrangements up to framework agreements on delivery on full IT Services. The activities can be 
divided over (1) IT-service activities which will provide technical support and professional service for 
information technology services for internal and external customers, (2) business processes within IT 
area to provide support in order to maintain an oversight of organizational activities such as design, 
production or service support and (3) IT customer delivery and care provided to customers which are 
carried out as part of an offshore contract within the IT service environment.  
Transactional cost economics (TCE), are cost as those associated with an economic exchange that 
vary independently of the competitive market price of the goods or services exchanged as shown in 
the theory from Williamson (1973). These include all search and information costs as well as the 
costs of monitoring.  
TCE will aim for highly efficient organizational form based on the transaction classification on the 
dimensions of asset specificity, frequency and uncertainty in order to research cost of activities 
during the contracting phase and carrying out the offshoring contract. In situations where there is 
uncertainty, high level of asset specific and frequent transactions, relationships are likely to be 
carried out in hierarchical approach in case of little uncertainty, not frequently and with less asset 
specific transactions relations are conducted in a market approach. Between these two extremes 
there will be hybrid relation types as well as described in the theory from Williamson (1979).   
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Bhalla, Sodhi, and Son (2008) defined the following activities IT service, business process within a IT 
area and customer delivery and care center as key activities within an IT service offshore 
relationship. Will these different types of offshore activities share the same risks for a outsourcer 
organization and how will these IT service activity risks be controlled? 
Despite all preparation by a company, offshoring activities are surrounded by risks. Offshoring risks 
relate to foreign country risks and to the flaws of imperfect markets that give rise to adverse 
selection and moral hazard within the offshore transaction. Alongside a variety of operational risks as 
shown in the theory from Michaeva (2010). In this paper I will determine if companies manage and 
control the offshoring risks differently depending on the management control pattern used for the IT 
service activities, business processes within IT area and IT customer delivery and care in their 
organization.  
1.2 Research Question  
How will management control be implemented by an outsourcer to counter different risks for (1) IT 
service, (2) Business process within IT area and (3) customer delivery and care center activities within 
an offshore relationship in the IT sector? 
1.2.1 Sub Questions: 
 What has been identified within the current literature on the management control implemented 
by an outsourcer to counter different risks for IT service, business process within a IT area and 
customer delivery and care center activities within an offshore relationship in the IT sector?  
 How do outsourcer companies manage and control the offshoring risks for IT service, business 
process within the IT area and customer delivery and care center activities within an offshore 
relationship between a West European outsourcer organization and a Asian agent organization 
within the IT service environment? 
 What new findings and theory confirmations can be found between the literature on 
management control by an outsourcer to counter different risks for (1) IT service, (2) business 
process within IT area and (3) customer delivery and center activities within the outsourcer 
organization and will this lead to an addition in to this field of literature?  
1.3 Research model 
The case study will be carried out over offshoring relationship between a West European outsourcer 
organization and a Asian agent organization for (1) IT service, (2) business process within a IT area 
and (3) customer delivery and care center activities within the IT service environment. A Literature 
study and theoretical framework will be created as part of this research and the will be checked 
against the offshoring relationship existing between the West European outsourcer organization and   
multiple Asian agent organizations.  
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Fig. 1: Research model  
1.4 Methodology and techniques 
This paper provides a review of the current academic literature on control of risks within the 
interorganizational relationships for offshore activities. The paper will be split up with the following 
tasks and order. It will start with academic literature review that focus on the links between forms, 
risks and controls of interorganizational relationships for offshore activities within an IT service 
environment from the outsourcer organization point of view. Followed on with a description of the 
data, methodology and techniques used as part of the research to expose gap in knowledge and/or 
consensus to address these findings against real life offshore relationship within the IT service 
environment. This by performing qualitative research interviews of key people involved on both sides 
of the organizational relationships. Followed by an analysis of the findings. Finally concluded by the 
discussion and conclusion of the research. 
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2 Literature Research 
This literature research will try to provide a model of the management controls available to counter 
offshoring risks. To establish this model, first of all the literature research will look at IOR. Secondly  
the offshoring relationship as a form of IOR will be discussed. One of the main drivers for offshore 
practices and mechanisms have been to lower and minimize the transaction costs as argued within 
the transaction cost economy theory and this will be the third item discussed in the literature 
research. TCE as a theory will try to explain why management will take mitigating measures within 
their organization as a result of risk caused by environmental influences and associated impacts due 
to bounded rationality, asset specificity, frequency, uncertainty and opportunistic behavior. Final to 
counter these offshoring risks management control and management control systems for the 
achievement of offshoring strategy implementation and objectives will be added to complete the 
model. 
2.1 Inter organizational relationships 
Business firms in all kinds of industries have entered inter organizational relationships to conduct 
their business deals for many years now. Relationships can be defined as the strategically important 
cooperative relationships between a principle organization and one or more other organizations with 
the aim of increasing performance by sharing or exchanging resources. No organization is on its own 
and all need relationships with other organizations in their own country and sometimes worldwide to 
survive and grow.  
“IORs exist in a variety of forms such as alliances, joint ventures, supply agreements, licensing, 
vertical relationships, franchising, cross-sector partnerships, networks, trade associations, and 
consortia”, (Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 2011, p. 2). Table 1 summarizes the different forms of 
relationships.  
 
Table 1 
IORs relationship forms, (Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 2011). 
IORs relationship form Definition 
Alliances Relationship existing for a set of time and task, typically involving a formal 
agreement between two partners with a strong emphasize on learning and 
innovation.  
Joint ventures Relate to the creation of a joint owned separate entity by the partners, with risks 
and rewards for both parties. The distinguishing feature of a joint venture is the 
existence of equity that can act as a mechanism for the governance. 
Vertical relationships Relationships based on vertical, supply chain nature and with multiple partners, 
examples are buyer-supplier agreements, outsourcing, offshoring, licensing and co-
branding 
Franchising One firm (franchiser) sells the rights to a second company (franchisee) to sell 
products/services under the brand name and by using the business model. There is 
a one to many relationship. 
Cross-Sector Partnership Partnerships known a “social alliances”, firms, non-profit organizations and/or 
governmental entities which work together to resolve a social issue. There is a very 
diverse composition of the partners and there is a wide variety of objectives 
between the partners, making it difficult to create and manage. 
Networks Targeted networks which offer concrete benefits to the members of the 
organizations with a many-to-many relations structure. Examples of networks, 
Trade Associations and Consortia.  
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2.2 Offshoring 
The vertical relationship IOR form “offshoring can be defined as performing work for customers in 
one country using workers located in a different country”, (Stratman, 2008, p. 1). Nicholson, Jones, 
and Espenlaub (2006) describe offshore as work which organizations transfer that has been done in 
their home country to an agent organization abroad. Offshore outsourcing involves the contracting 
out of activities or services by outsourcer organization to third-party agent based in countries other 
than the outsourcer home country. Organization can have many reasons to offshore, such as access 
to markets or new technologies however the primary business driver of offshoring is the dramatically 
lower labor costs in developing countries in comparison with those in developed countries.  
The differences between the outsourcer home country and the offshore location in terms of their 
environment, institutional and political frameworks cause signiﬁcant levels of uncertainty and 
information asymmetries. Examples of uncertainty and information asymmetries are lack of political 
stability, and uncertainty regarding the legal status of the agent organization, the offshore regulatory 
environment and legal system, differences in infrastructural standards, lack of comparable laws on 
data protection and other differences in the legal systems between the outsourcer home country 
and India limit the expected effectiveness of contract enforcement, variation in international 
accounting standards and practices and ﬁnancial reporting practices. These examples of uncertainty 
and information asymmetries ultimately can lead to risks for the outsource organization within the 
offshore relationship. 
2.2.1 Offshoring activities 
Outsourcer organizations offshore a wide variety of different types of IT Service activities. The 
activities can be divided over IT-services activities, business processes within an IT area and customer 
delivery and care which are carried out as part of an offshore contract within the IT service 
environment as defined within the theory from Bhalla et al. (2008). The level of offshoring the IT 
related services is related to the complexity of the activities. The more complex the work which need 
to be caried out the less likely it will be that the activity will be handed over to an agent organization. 
IT services activities can be seen as high end complexity work which requires high investments to be 
caried out by agent organization, business process within IT area activities can be seen as mid range 
complexity work and customer delivery and care are on the low end which requires only low 
investment to offshore. 
2.2.1.1 IT Services activities 
IT services activities provide technical support and professional service for information technology 
services for internal and external customers. Work will be performed via projects, carrying out 
elements of research analysis and or delivery of service in order to meet for the strategic objectives 
of an organization. Example activities within the IT service area are software development, 
application testing, content development, engineering and design and product optimization.  
The enterprise architect (EA) is a key role carried out within the outsourcer organization for creating 
the strategy direction and objectives within the IT Service activities. The EA is responsible for 
maintaining the enterprise architecture (EA), a description of the essential components of a business, 
including their interrelationships. Depending on the size of the organization this role can be divided 
over specialist EA roles like business architect, application architect, information architect, or 
infrastructure architect. This EA role is leading on the technical direction within the inter 
organizational relationships and is situated within the outsourcer organization. Therefor the 
contractor carrying out the IT services activities has little authority to determine how to do the work 
and what other activities to engage even though he owns the key assets used for the work. The EA 
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with authority will decide how the work will be done and what other activities can be performed but 
does not own the key assets, and is compensated according to the inputs provided without bearing 
risk from poor performance or reward for strong performance. 
2.2.1.2 Business process within IT area activities 
Business process within IT area activities will provide support in order to maintain an oversight of 
organizational activities such as design, production or service support. Where necessary and within 
larger IT service organization with a greater number of employees, a further subdivision can be 
appropriate for example processing of outsourcer client requests, processing of orders, execution of 
deliveries and resolving customer issues. The groups of activities created in this way are called 
“processes”, and for each process it is exactly determined which activities are to be carried out and 
how these are sequenced. It is also defined which inputs each process requires and which outputs it 
produces. Example activities within the business process activities area are transaction processing, 
accounts processing, customer administration, data processing and quality assurance. 
The EA role is leading on the technical direction within the inter organizational relationships and is 
situated within the outsourcer organization. Therefor the contractor carrying out the Business 
process activities has low authority to determine how to do the work and what other activities to 
engage even though he owns the key assets used for the work. The EA with authority will decide how 
the work will be done and what other activities can be performed but does not own the key assets, 
and is compensated according to the inputs provided without bearing risk from poor performance or 
reward for strong performance. 
2.2.1.3 Customer delivery and care center 
Customer delivery and care as part of offshoring IT services are teams directly interacting with the 
customers in the delivery or care of outsourcer organization product. Customers are engaged within 
the delivery process. The quality of the activities carried out by customer delivery and care centers 
are linked to the customer satisfaction input of the delivered services. 
Example activities within the customer delivery and care center activities area are help desk 
activities, delivery support/advice, technical support/ advice, customer support/ advice, customer 
relations management and employee inquiries. 
Most of the work is predefined as part of centralized agreed process but the lower level work 
instructions are owned by the offshore agent. Agents have the authority to change their internal 
processes and way of working as long as the service will be delivered according to the agreed 
contract terms and timelines. Table 2 “IT services and support activities summarizes” the 3 key 
activities. 
2.3 Transaction cost economy 
The Transaction cost economy theory argues that the offshore practices and mechanisms are 
designed to lower and minimize the transaction costs. The literature describes TCE as transaction 
costs as those associated with an economic exchange that vary independently of the competitive 
market price of the goods or services exchanged. These include all search and information costs as 
well as the costs of monitoring as highlighted in the theory of Williamson (1975). Ding, Dekker, and 
Groot (2013) argue that the TCE theory will investigate the control choices to minimize the 
transaction cost in line with the underlying business hazards and risks or inefficiencies. 
Asset speciﬁcity of activities within an offshore relation can be seen as a key factor influencing 
efﬁciency and transaction costs impacting the governance structures. TCE theory suggests that asset 
speciﬁcity is an important factor because of opportunism displayed by the agent within the offshore 
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relationship because organization may have difﬁculty writing complete contracts or evaluating the 
performance of partner organizations as highlighted in the theory of Williamson (1979). Other areas 
within a TCE setting are governance and control structure to counter transaction risk within an inter 
firm cooperation such as offshoring. “TCE has become one of the dominant paradigms to analyze 
management control choices in interfirm relationships”, (Ding et al., 2013, p. 140). 
2.3.1 TCE characteristics 
TCE theory describes three transaction characteristics on how the transactions are carried out and 
controlled. The first characteristic is asset specificity of the transaction which describes the size of 
the opportunity losses that will be incurred in case of termination before completion of a contract. 
The second characteristic is uncertainty which refers to the degree of which parties can specify the 
intended performance and predict impact from environmental factors in the execution of a contract, 
and the third characteristic is frequency element within a contract as described within the theory 
from (Speklé, 2001).  
Bounded rationality is linked to the asset specificity of the transactions. Nicholson et al. (2006) 
describes bounded rationality as the human limitation to fully understand and evaluate all available 
information, processes and implications within an offshoring relationship. Opportunistic behavior of 
partners impacting TCE can be linked to the uncertainty characteristic.  
2.3.2 Forms of TCE 
TCE has emerged as a common theory for understanding the control choice of managers to build 
their governance structure of their organization or IOR. “The general proposition of this literature is 
that managers align the governance features of interorganizational relationships to match known 
exchange hazards, particularly those associated with specialized asset investments, difﬁcult 
performance measurement, or uncertainty”, (Poppo & Zenger, 2002, p. 1). In order to control the 
problems of contracting, the TCE theory defines three management control forms to manage the 
transactions: markets, hybrids and hierarchies. Each of the three forms have their own governance 
structure and control mechanisms to establish efficient contracting execution.  
Free market competition is the driving force within the market governance form. Long term contracts 
and different form of protective measures and safeguarding practices are the base for the hybrid 
form whereas the hierarchical governance form is based on authority, incentive structure and 
monitoring of results as highlighted within the theory of Speklé (2001).  
The IT service activities require highly developed IT skills due to the complex nature of the work and 
innovative levels to create new services and products. The delivery of new services and products 
include high uncertainty in the availability of knowledge and capabilities within both people and 
hardware to complete the new products and services successfully. The business process within IT 
area can be seen as mid-range on complexity and uncertainty as it require less complex and 
innovative skills as performed within the IT service activities but they are still creating new process 
solutions for new or improved products and services. The low end of the scale will be seen within the 
customer delivery and care activities. These activities can be categorized as routine work as the work 
is highly regulated in method of output for products and services created as part of the other two 
activities types. Table 2 “IT services and support activities summarizes” shows the 3 key activities 
relating to the management control forms of transactions.  
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Table 2: 
IT Services and support activities 
IT Services Business Processes Customer delivery and care centers 
Activity examples   
Software development Transaction processing Help desk 
Delivery support/advice 
Application testing Accounts processing Technical support/advice 
Content development Customer administration Customer Support/advice 
Engineering and design Data processing Customer relations management 
Product optimization 
 
Asset specificity 
High 
Quality assurance 
 
 
Medium 
Employee inquiries 
 
 
Low 
 
Uncertainty 
High uncertainty 
 
 
medium uncertainty 
 
 
Low uncertainty 
 
2.4 Risk Factors affecting transactional cost of offshoring 
Risk is a word used frequently in day to day activities though the context and reason for which the 
word is used are widely spread. The risk can vary and have different meaning due to elements such 
as the probability that risk occur, the severity of risks and the consequences on an assets. Within the 
economic perspective risk can be seen as the link between potential gains or losses and the 
alternative options to avoid the risks. “In the managerial perspective uncertainty about positive 
outcomes is not considered important as they constitute the attractiveness of a given alternative. 
Rather, risk is associated with negative outcomes. Risk is therefore perceived as a danger or hazard”. 
(Bahli & Rivard, 2003, p. 211-212). 
IT offshoring relationships can cause operational and strategic risks which will prevent organizations 
from achieving their short-term and long term objectives. This can lead to extensive financial losses 
and damage to the corporate reputation. Therefore, proper identification of the relevant risks, 
preventing the transfer of the existing risks and mitigating the negative impacts of the emerging risks 
are of important for the outsourcer organization and their customers. Offshore relationships can be 
impacted by a wide variety of risk for example risk related to unexpected transition and management 
costs, switching costs, costly contractual, disputes and litigation, service debasement, escalation and 
hidden service cost and loss of organizational competency.  
TCE differentiates a set of potential risks which can be caused by the following characteristics, 
bounded rationality, asset specificity, frequency, uncertainty and opportunistic behavior of agent. 
Asset specificity risk of premature termination can cause risk of value lose in absence of sufficiently 
powerful safeguards. Opportunism exposed by agents can cause risk of opportunistic expropriation, 
and will require measures to identify potential gains from opportunism and of the intensity. Incentive 
towards agents can be used to channelize this behavior correctly.  
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The sharing of private information and know-how are required to carry out TCE contracted activities. 
Therefore, parties to such an exchange are exposed to the risk of information spill-over as 
contracting requires sharing of genuinely important strategic information. Information asymmetry 
between the outsourcer and supplier can be seen as risk due to information sharing issues between 
parties due to uncertainty on the transactions and contracts. Bounded rationality on the TCE contract 
can even put in more risk on this issue as contracts are bound to be incomplete and this will increase 
when uncertainty rises. 
In order to determine the list of undesirable outcomes and their risks Aubert, Patry, and Rivard 
(2005) deducted a list from transaction cost theory and the agent theory. The elements of this list are 
shown in Table 3 “Components of IT outsourcing risk exposer”, (Aubert et al., 2005).  
Table 3: 
Components of IT outsourcing risk exposer framework.  
Undesirable outcomes Factors leading to outcome 
Unexpected transition and 
management costs 
- Lack of experience and expertise of the agent with the activity 
- Lack of experience of the agent with Outsourcing 
- Uncertainty about the legal environment 
Switching costs - Asset specificity 
- Small number of suppliers 
- Scope 
- Interdependence of activities 
Costly contractual - Uncertainly 
- Technological discontinuity 
- Task complexity 
Disputes and litigation - Lack of experience and expertise of the agent and/or the supplier 
with Outsourcing contracts 
- Uncertainly about the legal environment 
- Poor cultural fit 
Service debasement - Interdependence of activities 
- Lack of experience and expertise of the supplier with the activity 
- Supplier size 
- Supplier financial instability 
- Task complexity 
Cost escalation and hidden service 
costs 
- Lack of experience and expertise of the agent with contract 
management 
- Uncertainty 
- Measurement problems 
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- Lack of experience and expertise of the supplier with the activity 
Complexity of the activities 
Loss of organizational competency - Scope of the activities 
- Proximity to the core competency 
  
 
2.4.1 Unexpected transition and management costs  
At the start of the offshoring relationship the outsourcer organization can be faced with unexpected 
cost associated to the move of the activities from the outsource organization in to the new supplier 
organization and cost of additional management activity to resolve these starting up problems. The 
increase of cost can be caused by supplier organization which show less experience and expertise of 
offshored activities than agreed as part of the contract. Other factors which will lead to this risk are 
high uncertainty of ethics and behavior within an offshore relationship and uncertainty about the 
legal environment of the supplier from the outsourcer organization perspective.  
The displayed lack of experience or expertise from the supplier organization can be caused by 
opportunism assumption on the skill levels. Opportunism “makes provision for self-interest seeking 
with guile” (Williamson, 1981, p. 554). Suppliers within an offshore relationship may violate 
agreements by lying, covering up problems, cheating or otherwise cutting corners for personal 
advantage which is not in best interest for the outsourcer organization. Additional time and effort 
will need to be spent by the outsourcer organization in monitoring and controlling the contracted 
relationship, which raises transactions costs during this first phase of the offshore contract as 
highlighted in the theory from Stratman (2008). In his theory that failure of contractual obligations 
on the level of expertise due to opportunistic behavior from agents will lead to additional 
management costs associated with collecting and integrating information into the decision process, 
and the cost of the transaction risk. Meira et al. (2010) refers to the additional coordination and 
control costs and costs related to the risk of the supplier acting opportunistically or performing 
poorly.  
2.4.2 Risks related to switching costs 
High investments for offshoring due to high asset specificity activities cause significance risk for 
switching cost for the outsourcer organization. Other factors leading to risk of switching cost are low 
number of suppliers available to perform the activities, specific scope activities and interdependency 
with other activities. 
The threat of high switching cost is considerably increased in cases of high asset specificity, for 
example when a outsourcer client-specific knowledge is required for the development and 
maintenance work, coordination costs are expected to increase. The outsourcer organization will be 
locked in with the supplier to avoid write off of these investments as a result of premature 
termination of offshore contracts. This ‘lock in’ can be exploited by the suppliers for example by 
renegotiating contact terms. It is important to note that the argument is not that outsourcer client-
specific knowledge leads to more extra costs, but rather that in case of high asset specificity vendor 
opportunistic behavior leads to more extra costs. The level of asset specificity and counter measures 
to safeguard exposer to the risk of switching costs at offshoring relationships will determine the 
potential gains or losses from opportunistic behavior as shown within the literature from Speklé 
(2001).  
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2.4.3 Risks related to costly contractual. 
Uncertainty of the future can lead to changes of the desired offshore contract. This can ultimately 
lead to contractual change cost for the outsourcer. Speklé (2001) deﬁnes uncertainty as the degree 
of speciﬁability of intended performance and predictability of (the inﬂuence of) the environment 
within which the contract is to be executed. In TCE theory uncertainty is caused by a range of risk 
sources such as market dynamics, external forces outside the own organization or complexity and 
unfamiliarity of activities but the effect of these different sources are the same. Speklé (2001) 
describes this effect as transaction cost which are not effected by up front programmability and that 
they will remain flexible to allow for changes which will unfold during the lifecycle of the contract. 
Offshore contracts for IT services have a high tendency of being uncertain due to lack of details in the 
requirement and unknown capabilities of new technology used for these type of IT projects and 
implementation can be full of surprises and technological shortfalls. Short-term contracts may attract 
cost reduction on contracts but contract cannot foresee all the uncertainties. Flexibility may be 
better than specifying tight performance contracts with penalty clauses, followed by litigation. The 
challenge is about finding the right balance between flexibility and cost implications. 
Factors leading to the offshore contractual change costs risks are cost due to scope changes on 
running projects and the dependencies with projects and new technology resulting in additional cost. 
Management control elements to avoid offshore uncertainty and contractual change cost risks are 
performance management, clear drive for scope, milestone and target setting to avoid uncertainty 
within the IT service activities. Organizational behavior is also a key element to create a balance 
between flexibility and cost as people within the offshore relationship are mostly the cause of the 
changes. 
2.4.4 Risks related to disputes and litigation 
The described risks as shown in table 3 related to the offshore contract between outsourcer and 
agent organization which ultimately can lead to bargaining, legal disputes and litigation between 
both parties. The issues can be caused as a result of lack of offshoring experience and expertise of 
the agent organization, uncertainly about the legal environment in both organizations and cultural 
differences within the inter organizational relationships. Importance of legal issues is further 
elevated as, at every phase of an offshoring agreement, compliance issues and contractual 
obligations can affect the success of the outsourcer organization and its relationship with its agent 
organization. Issues commonly affecting the offshoring contracts are choosing a governing law for 
the contract, establishing which regulatory laws apply, considering data protection, resolving licenses 
and usage permissions.  
The risks related to legal issues may prove to be enormous if not addressed at the start of the 
decisions process regarding offshore relationship. An example provided by Tafti (2005) demonstrates 
the high legal risks an organization will take if they lack proactive measures to safeguard individual 
privacy and their information assets.  
2.4.5 Risks related to service debasement 
Factors such as interdependence of activities carried out, the lack of experience and expertise of the 
supplier with the activity, supplier sizing issues, supplier financial instability and task complexity can 
lead to unsatisfied performance results of the agent. The effect of the service debasement risks will 
be felt within the outsourcer organization as it can impacted the wider service and efficiency levels to 
their customers. The service levels of agents can be impacted by geopolitical problems which can be 
caused by instability of the political situation. Agents service levels can be negatively impacted by 
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factors such as strikes or power cuts as described by Khan, Currie, Weerakkody, and Desai (2003). 
Lower level work carried within the Customer delivery and care activities are more impacted by 
service debasement due to the high number of resources required and the fixed location for this type 
of activities whereas the higher end work carried out by IT services resources are more decentralized 
and make use of IT facilities not directly linked to an designated office space. 
2.4.6 Risks related to loss of organizational competency 
Loss of IT expertise within the outsourcer organization decides to let a third party take over its IT 
functions. The outsourcer organization no longer needs to retain many of its IT services. From the 
outsourcer organization perspective it will lower the payroll cost. However, Tafti (2005) describes the 
loss of key IT services skills as the ultimate risk of losing a signiﬁcant portion of corporate IT talent 
and future ability to learn. The loss of skills can cause loss of organizational competencies which can 
make organizations vulnerable. Lack of IT Service expertise can be seen as dangerous, since the firm 
will have lost its ability to use IT efficiently and effectively, and will remain dependent on an external 
supplier.  
Tafti (2005) highlights that lack of skills within the outsourcer organization may also impact contract 
negotiation due to the lack of individuals that understand the ﬁrm’s business and possess to precisely 
deﬁne its requirements necessary for contract negotiations. This will provide the agent with great 
contract negotiation advantage over the outsourcer. Factors leading to the loss of organizational 
competency risks are the level of scope complexity of the activities. Geographical distance between 
the offshored core competency carried out by the agent and the outsourcer can further weaken the 
position of the outsourcer during contract negotiations.  
2.4.7 Risk related to Cost escalation and hidden service costs 
Agents performance degradation on the offshore services will lead to additional management 
support from the outsourcer organization to control and drive to improve on the activities resulting 
in additional costing on escalation or service. Factors leading to higher cost of escalation and hidden 
service costs are lack of experience and expertise of the agent with contract management, 
uncertainty, measurement problems, lack of experience and expertise of the supplier with the 
activity and complexity of the activities. Table 4 “IT Services and support activities and associated 
risks” summarizes the risks details from the previous chapters 2.4.1 until 2.4.7. 
Table 4: 
IT Services and support activities and associated risks 
 IT Services Business Processes Customer delivery and care 
centers 
Activity examples    
  Software development Transaction processing Help desk 
  Application testing Accounts processing Technical support/advice 
  Content development Customer administration Customer Support/advice 
  Engineering and design Data processing Customer relations 
management 
  Product optimization Quality assurance Employee inquiries 
Risks impact 
 
  
High impact on unexpected 
transition and management 
 
Medium impact on unexpected 
transition and management 
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costs risks 
 
High impact on switching costs 
risks 
 
High impact on costly 
contractual changes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High impact on loss of 
organizational competency 
risks  
 
High impact on Cost escalation 
and hidden service costs risks  
costs 
 
Medium impact on switching 
costs risks 
 
Medium impact on costly 
contractual changes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High impact on loss of 
organizational competency 
risks  
 
High impact on Cost escalation 
and hidden service costs risks  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High impact on disputes and 
litigation risks. 
 
Service debasement risks 
 
 
 
 
 
High impact on Cost escalation 
and hidden service costs risks 
 
2.5 Management controls 
Management control is a critical function in organizations as failures in management control can 
ultimately lead to extensive financial losses and damage to the corporate reputation. The structuring 
and control of IORs requires the creation of management control systems and processes. 
Management control and management control systems can be used to improve inter organizational 
relationship as well as employee engagement, motivation in relation to the achievement of inter 
organizational strategy implementation and objectives by using performance management. Within 
an offshore contract relationship elements such as bounded rational, opportunistic behavior, culture, 
resource control and motivation play an important role and have impact on the structure used for 
management control. All will relate to the process of organizing resources and directing activities in 
order to achieving organizational objectives or in case of offshore activities the objectives set for the 
offshore contract.  
In this paper we investigate how inter organizational relationships can be controlled. We build a 
model of the management control structure of inter organizational relationships and indicate which 
factors influence the choice of the management control structure. We will use theory, in particular 
transaction cost theory when referring to factors which are relevant for the drawing up of 
management control structures.  
The management control elements for offshore contract relationship will need to interplay with the 
offshoring characteristics bounded rational, opportunistic behavior, culture, resource control and 
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motivation. To help achieve organizational objectives or in case of offshore activities the objectives 
set for the offshore contract the management control approach based on the theory from Merchant 
and Van der Stede (2012) can be used.  
2.5.1 Merchants controls  
The theory of Merchant and Van der Stede (2012) distinguish three types of management control 
problems, lack of control, motivation problems, personal limitations. 
The theory which is part of the Behavior oriented and relativizing perspective suggest that 
unavoidable control problems require the implementation of management control mechanisms. 
They distinguished four forms: results-, action-, personnel- and cultural controls.  
Result Controls are controls to influence behavior of the employees within the different levels in an 
organization via incentive rewarding system. Important mechanisms of result control are pay for 
performance and rewarding employees after creating good results as an incentive tool. In order to 
implement result controls an organization will need to establish performance dimensions, perform 
performance measurements and determine performance goals and rewards. The effectiveness of 
result control depends on the knowledge of the intended result, the possibilities to influence the 
intended result and the ability to measure controllable result elements effectively within the 
organization and the individual teams and employees 
Action Control are controls to improve the chance that employees perform beneficial actions and to 
avoid employees performing harmful action to the organization. Organizations can setup behavioral 
constraints to avoid or reduce the chance of harmful actions such as physical constraints like 
passwords and access restrictions or administrative constraints such as internal control processes. 
Actions controls can be achieved by pre-action reviews, action accountability and redundancy. 
Actions controls can positively influence issues caused by lack of direction, motivation problems and 
personal limitations.  
Personnel Control is based on the discipline of self-control and self-motivation of employees in an 
organization. The key characteristics are self-monitoring, ability to do good, having commitment and 
personal control by selection, training and job design of key resources. Choosing the right match on 
new employees will have a positive effect motivation and quality of the employees and one of the 
controls necessary to have organizational success in future. Personal control will help improve on 
organizational issues caused by lack of direction, motivation problems and personal limitations.  
Cultural Control aims on improving mutual monitoring within an organization through peer pressure 
with regard to beliefs and values. The key characteristics are codes of conducts, group rewards, 
employee rotation, physical arrangements and social arrangements. Cultural controls will help 
improve on organizational issues caused by lack of direction and personal limitations. Merchant 
(2000) describes that cultural controls thrive on trust intrinsic motivation and do not have a need for 
clear quantifiable goals. Table 5 “IT Services and support activities management control per risk” 
summarizes the management controls used per IT services activities. 
High asset specificity can lead to opportunistic behavior at the agent organization. A combination of 
high uncertainty and risk for opportunistic behavior as shown within IT Service and business process 
activities can’t be managed via result controls or action controls alone as contracts can’t contain all 
details to avoid risks. They will require cultural control element trust in between the partners to 
control this risk as shown within the theory from Kamminga and Van der Meer-Kooistra (2007). 
However this element of control play only a minimal role when activities are standard, based on 
routine processes and predictable performance results such as customer delivery and care activities.  
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2.5.2 IT Services activity used management controls to counter available risks 
Risk related to unexpected transition and management costs will show within the IT service activities 
as cost due to lack of expertise and opportunistic behavior on the skills by the agent. As the asset 
specificity of the IT service activity is high cost impact for this risk is equally high. The following 
management controls can be used to counter these risks: clear objective setting as part of defining 
performance dimensions combined with measuring performance of the offshore activities, providing 
incentives and reward on the performed work and risk sharing as part of result controls within the 
literature of Merchant and Van der Stede (2012) to control this risk. 
Risks related to switching costs. Due to high investments requirement and the high asset specificity 
of IT service activities there is a significant risk for switching cost for the outsourcer offshoring 
organization. To overcome the problems of utilization of business critical information outside the 
offshore partnership the outsourcer can lay down behavioral constrains and reward/incentives to 
work in the best interest of the outsourcer organization. Action controls in the form of behavioral 
constraints and action accountability are management controls available within the literature of 
Merchant and Van der Stede (2012) to control this risk. The cultural controls such to improve 
competence and contractual trust in between partners will be required to strengthen the 
relationship to avoid switching agent.  
Risks related to costly contractual. Due to high uncertainty, complexity of the activities and the use of 
highly innovative and new technology within the work carried out by IT service activities there is a 
significant risk for change cost for the outsourcer offshoring organization. Management control 
elements to avoid offshore uncertainty and contractual change cost risks are clear performance 
target setting to drive for correct scope, project milestones to avoid changes within the projects run 
within the IT service activities. Organizational behavior is also a key element to create a balance 
between flexibility and cost as people behavior are the cause of the changes in the projects. 
Risks related to loss of organizational competency. The loss of high asset specificity skills within the IT 
service activities area can cause loss of organizational competencies which can make outsource 
organizations vulnerable for current and future IT development. Management control elements to 
avoid loss of organizational competency risks are training and development for IT service activities 
within its own organization, clear target setting within the offshore relationship and measurement of 
the outcomes and as part of an increase in the relationship include rewards and incentives within the 
partnership to engaging the agent. The cultural controls to improve competence and contractual 
trust in between partners will be required to strengthen the relationship to avoid vulnerability 
towards the agent. 
Risk related to Cost escalation and hidden service costs. Performance degradation on the IT service 
activities will lead to additional management support from the outsourcer organization to control 
and drive to improve on the activities resulting in additional costing on escalation or service. 
Management control elements to avoid higher cost of escalation and hidden service costs risks are 
clear target setting within the offshore relationship and measurement of the outcomes and rewards 
and incentives within the partnership to engaging the agent.  
2.5.3 Business process within IT area used management controls to counter available risks 
Risk related to unexpected transition and management costs will show within the business process 
within IT area as cost due to lack of expertise and opportunistic behavior on the skills by the agent. 
As the asset specificity of the IT service activity is medium cost impact for this risk is not as high as 
within IT service activity but still significantly. The following management control can be used to 
counter these risks, clear objective setting as part of defining performance dimensions combined 
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with measuring performance of the offshore activities, providing incentives and reward on the 
performed work and risk sharing as part of result controls are management controls available within 
the literature of Merchant and Van der Stede (2012) to control this risks. 
Risks related to switching costs. Due to medium investments linked to offshoring high asset 
specificity of Business process within IT area activities there is a significance risk for switching cost for 
the outsourcer offshoring organization. To overcome the problems of utilization of business critical 
information outside the offshore partnership the outsourcer can lay down behavioral constrains and 
reward/incentives to work in the best interest of the outsourcer organization. Action controls in the 
form of behavioral constraints and action accountability are management controls available within 
the literature of Merchant and Van der Stede (2012) to control this risk. The cultural controls to 
improve competence and contractual trust in between partners will be required to strengthen the 
relationship to avoid switching agent. 
Risks related to costly contractual. Due to medium uncertainty, complexity of the activities within the 
work carried out by Business process within IT area activities there is a medium risk for change cost 
for the outsourcer offshoring organization. Management control elements to avoid offshore 
uncertainty and contractual change cost risks are clear performance target setting to drive for 
correct scope, project milestones to avoid changes within the projects run within the IT service 
activities. Organizational behavior is also a key element to create a balance between flexibility and 
cost as people behavior within the offshore relationship project are a cause of the changes in the 
projects. 
Risks related to loss of organizational competency. The loss of medium asset specificity skills within 
the business process area can cause loss of organizational competencies which can make 
organizations vulnerable for current and future IT development. Management control elements to 
avoid loss of organizational competency risks are training and development for IT service activities 
within its own organization, clear target setting within the offshore relationship and measurement of 
the outcomes and as part of an increase in the relationship include rewards and incentives within the 
partnership to engaging the agent. The cultural controls to improve competence and contractual 
trust in between partners will be required to strengthen the relationship to avoid vulnerability 
towards the agent. 
Risk related to Cost escalation and hidden service costs. Performance degradation on the business 
process activities will lead to additional management support from the outsourcer organization to 
control and drive to improve on the activities resulting in additional costing on escalation or service. 
Management control elements to avoid higher cost of escalation and hidden service costs risks are 
clear target setting within the offshore relationship and measurement of the outcomes and rewards 
and incentives within the partnership to engaging the agent.  
2.5.4 Customer delivery and care used management controls to counter available risks 
Risks related to disputes and litigation. Issues commonly affecting the offshoring contracts are 
choosing a governing law for the contract, establishing which regulatory laws apply, considering data 
protection, resolving licenses and usage permissions to provide delivery and care support for 
outsourcer organization customers. Management control elements to avoid legal risk within an 
offshore relation are performance measurements as part of result controls and behavioral 
constraints as part of action controls to avoid missuse of information and legal contract breach with 
the customers or in-country regulatory bodies.  
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Risks related to service debasement. Due to the high resource demand of the work carried out within 
customer delivery and care actors lack of experience and expertise of the supplier with the activity, 
supplier sizing issues and supplier financial instability can lead to unsatisfied performance results of 
the agent from an outsourcer organization perspective. The effect of the service debasement risks 
will be felt within the outsourcer organization as it can impact the wider service and efficiency levels 
to the customers. Result control elements to avoid legal risk within an offshore relation are 
performance definition, target setting and measurements in the form of service level agreements to 
control the service level provided by the agent. 
Risk related to Cost escalation and hidden service costs. Performance degradation on the customer 
delivery and care activities will lead to additional management support from the outsourcer 
organization to control and drive to improve on the activities resulting in additional costing on 
escalation or service. Management control elements to avoid higher cost of escalation and hidden 
service costs risks are clear target setting within the offshore relationship and measurement of the 
outcomes and rewards and incentives within the partnership to engaging the agent.  
Table 5: 
IT Services and support activities management controls per risk 
 IT Services Business Processes Customer delivery and 
care centers 
Activity examples    
  Software development Transaction processing Help desk 
  Application testing Accounts processing Technical support/advice 
  Content development Customer administration Customer Support/advice 
  Engineering and design Data processing Customer relations 
management 
  Product optimization Quality assurance Employee inquiries 
Risks impact 
 
Risk related to 
unexpected transition 
and management costs 
 
 
Risk related to switching 
cost 
 
 
 
 
Risk related to costly 
contractual changes 
 
 
 
Risks related to disputes 
and litigation 
 
 
 
 
Risks to service 
debasement 
Management controls 
  
Result control (Define 
performance measures, 
Rewards/Incentives, 
Measurement) 
 
Cultural control (trust) 
Action control 
(Rewards/Incentives, 
Personal control, 
Behavioral constraints) 
 
Action control 
(Behavioral constraints), 
Result control (setting 
performance targets) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Result control (Define 
performance measures, 
Rewards/Incentives, 
Measurement) 
 
Cultural control (trust) 
Action control 
(Rewards/Incentives, 
Personal control, 
Behavioral constraints) 
 
Action control 
(Behavioral constraints), 
Result control (setting 
performance targets) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Result control (Define 
performance measures, 
Measurement) 
Action control 
(Behavioral constraints) 
 
Result control (Define and 
performance measures, 
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High impact on loss of 
organizational 
competency risks  
 
 
 
 
 
High impact on Cost 
escalation and hidden 
service costs risks 
 
 
 
 
 
Cultural control (trust) 
Result control (Define and 
performance measures, target 
setting, measuring 
performance, 
Rewards/Incentives) 
Personal control (training) 
 
Result control (measuring 
performance, 
Rewards/Incentives) 
 
 
 
Cultural control (trust) 
 Result control (Define and 
performance measures, target 
setting, measuring 
performance, 
Rewards/Incentives) 
Personal control (training) 
 
Result control (measuring 
performance, 
Rewards/Incentives) 
target setting, measuring 
performance) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Result control (measuring 
performance, 
Rewards/Incentives) 
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3 Methodology 
3.1 Research Strategy 
For the fulfilment of this thesis there are different set of research strategies available, such as case 
study, survey, experiment, research archives and history. According to the theory of Yin (2003) the 
case study method can be used as a method of research as a case study is preferred research 
strategy when 'why' and 'how' questions be asked about a number of events over which the 
researcher has little or no control, (Yin, 2003). In order to gain insights into the field of offshore (1) IT 
service, (2) business processes within an IT area and (3) customer delivery and care activities a case 
study will need to be conducted.  
Yin (2003) identifies three types of research case studies, exploratory, descriptive and explanatory. 
The exploratory research case is used in order to define a research questions and hypothesis to test, 
or to an investigation procedure. The descriptive research case study is used to describe a specific 
phenomenon and the explanatory research case study explores cause-effect relationships and or 
how certain events. This thesis examines the cause and effect of risks and management control 
within IT service offshore setting as part of an explanatory case study. 
3.2 Case Selection 
In order to find a suitable research case I have started looking within the company I am currently 
working for. I am working in a IT company within the IT service area which I joined in 2001 and 
working with teams inside my own organization as well as agent organization via offshore 
relationships. This implies I have a lot of affinity with offshore relationships as discussed within this 
thesis. 
Despite the fact that I have been part of an offshoring relationship, I was never involved in the 
management of this or any other contract, so I don’t have any bias towards the relation between 
trust and control in managing IT offshore contracts and this will not prevent me for an open-minded 
and critical attitude to this subject as required for this scientific research. 
Conversations with colleagues showed a wide range of positive but also negative issues as part of 
offshore activities carried out within the organization. Despite the existence of detailed contracts and 
management control structures the outsourcer is challenged with risks as part of these relationships. 
In order to understand these risks and the possible management controls to counter these risks 
within an offshore contract, I decided to select this case for further research as part of my thesis.  
Instead of randomly selecting the offshoring relationships with the request to research their 
partnerships, it is important to select the cases based on the proposition, (1) IT service, (2) Business 
process within a IT area and (3) customer delivery and care center activities within the IT service 
environment. Using exploratory case study as research method will enable me to conduct an analysis 
of the offshore relationships for the propositions identified within the theoretical framework and 
collect the required information as part of the empirical research. Each of the propositions will be a 
case and for each proposition a key member of both outsourcer organization as well as the agent 
organization will be approached. Within the case studies for each of the propositions the unit of 
analysis is the relationship between the outsourcer and the agent.  
This will result in the following three cases, (1) offshore contract between the West European 
outsourcer organization and supplier #1 supporting an IT Service proposition, (2) offshore contract 
between West European outsourcer and supplier #2 supporting a business process within a IT area 
proposition and (3) offshore contract between West European outsourcer and supplier #3 supporting 
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a customer delivery and care center proposition which have been empirical examined as part of this 
research.  
3.3 Data collection and analysis 
Yin (2003)distinguishes a set of sources of evidence for conducting case studies such as documents, 
archival records, interviews and physical artifacts. For most case studies (open-ended) interviews are 
the most important source of evidence, while documents, archival records and physical artifacts are 
used to support and corroborate the evidence found by interviewing persons. 
Personal interviews with key informants will be carried out to find out more about management 
control be implemented to counter different risks within an offshore relationship in the IT sector to 
identify causal relationships, (Yin, 2003).  
In order to gather data for each case a senior manager and a line manager out of the outsourcer 
organization and one line manager out of the agent organization will be interviewed to describe their 
experiences.  Table 6 ‘Interviews per case’ shows the interviewee per case, per proposition divided 
over the outsourcer and agents. 
Table 6: 
Interviews per case 
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
Case description Offshore contract between 
outsourcer and supplier #1 
Offshore contract between 
outsourcer and supplier #2 
Offshore contract between 
outsourcer and supplier #3 
Proposition IT service Business process within a IT 
area 
customer delivery and care 
center 
Senior manager level 
outsourcer  
R. 
Head architect outsourcer 
 
R. 
VP outsourcer 
S. 
VP operations outsourcer 
Line Manager level 
outsourcer 
 
 
D. 
Lead architect outsourcer 
 
M. 
Head process team  
P. 
Head of service delivery 
outsourcer 
Line manager level agent S. 
Line manager supplier #1 
S. 
Line manager process team 
supplier #2 
A. 
Line manager service 
delivery team supplier #3 
 
The respective company representatives will be interviewed in an open one-hour interview. The 
interview language will be English. All interviews will be carried by use of Skype for business 
facilities/conference call. The interviews will be based on a semi-structured interview guideline that 
will included several questions about the role person play within the relationship, the level of asset 
specificity and uncertainty of the work carried out by the agent, risks related the relationship and the 
method of management control used to minimize the risks highlighted.  
The interview guideline have been included in the Appendix A of this case study. Each interviewee 
will be provided with the keywords of the subjects prior to the interview in order to give them 
opportunity to prepare for the interview. All interviews will be recorded and summarized. The 
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transcripts will be reduced by coding and clustering of the transcripts in order to perform data 
reduction, “considering data by summarizing or simplifying these as a means to analyzing them”, 
(Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2012) to run pattern matching analysis, “analysis of qualitative data 
involving the prediction of a pattern of outcomes based on theoretical propositions to see to explain 
a set of findings”, (Saunders et al., 2012), on the data. 
As part of interview preparation interviewees will receive short description of the key variables which 
will be used as part of the research and interviews to make them familiar with the used concepts 
such as inter organizational relationships, management control and risks.  
3.4 Methodological quality  
In order to perform scientific research measures need to be planned to optimize the methodological 
quality of the research project. An essential condition to achieve sufficient methodological quality is 
to pursue methodological objectivity, which implies that the research conclusions must do justice to 
the object of study in relation with the research questions. Generally accepted standards in pursuit of 
methodological objectivity are reliability and validity. 
3.4.1 Validity  
Validity can be seen as the absence of systematic distortions of the object of study. Visible as part of 
the characteristic of the design, methods and techniques of the research leading to the interim and 
final results. Validity can be divided over construct validity, internal and external validity of a 
research project.  
Construct validity refers to the degree correctness of the measures used within the case study to 
cover the theoretical variables correctly. As part of the case study the following elements will need to 
increase the construct validity of the research. I will make use of multiple sources for the interviews 
out of multiple outsourcer teams as well as their offshoring partners to triangulate the interview data 
and as part of the interviews the key informants will be asked to review draft transcripts. Internal 
validity refers to the presence of causal relationships between variables and results of the case study, 
(Gilbert, 1989). Using the same key variables and definitions from the literature within the structure 
questions creation, interviews and analysis will positively impact the internal validity of the case 
study. Pattern matching method will be used as part of the analysis of the interview transcripts.  
External validity refers to the degree to which the result of the research case can be statistically or 
analytically generalized. “Statistical generalization refers to the generalization from observation to a 
population, analytical generalization denotes a process that refers to the generalization from 
empirical observations to theory”, (Gibbert & Ruigrok, 2010).  The research of three cases will cause 
a restrictions on the statistical generalization as the specific nature of the cases will make it 
impossible to realize in a different setting. The results out of the qualitative case study need to be  
generalized against a particular theory as part of the analytic generalization. The case study includes 
a logical breakdown of the concept and variables of the theory at the beginning of case study 
research and the findings of the research cases will need to support the theory to show how these 
findings can be generalized to similar situations. Another important element for the external validity 
will be the fact that offshore risks are contexts dependent per proposition situation. The including of 
context specific element within the questions should lead to bypassing of the proposition specific 
elements. 
3.4.2 Reliability  
Reliability refers to the degree the research case results can be repeated by another researcher and 
come up with the same findings. In order to achieve sufficient level of reliability. The following items 
27 
 
have been included in the research study. The paper will report on the specifics how the entire case 
study will be conducted. A case study database will be including the case study notes, the case study 
documents, and the key findings collected during the study, organized to support later researchers. 
The interview questions for the empirical research of the propositions are based on the 
operationalization of the key elements asset specificity, uncertainty, offshore risk categories and 
management controls to counter the offshore risks as identified within the literature research of this 
thesis. The questions list is available within Appendix A Questionnaire of this research.    
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4 Analysis of research cases 
4.1 Case Offshore contract between outsourcer and supplier #1 IT Service 
relationship 
The outsourcer organization is a global company within the telecommunication and IT service 
industry. The outsourcer IT service team is responsible for the introduction of services in a division of 
the outsourcer organization and is managing a team of designers supporting a range of products and 
services. The IT service team perform a design role accountable for the generic and detailed designs 
as part of the service introduction and changes on existing services for the outsourcer organization.   
4.1.1 Offshore relationship 
IT service resource cost reduction for the outsourcer organization is seen as the main motivations to 
offshore IT service design role. The access to a wide knowledge base and resources is another reason 
for offshoring the work. The offshore contracts also provide flexibility to the outsourcer organization 
as the IT service resource demand is not flat over the year. The IT service offshore contract between 
the outsourcer and the supplier #1 started a few years back. The outsourcer maintains a strong 
offshore relation with supplier #1 outside the IT service activities which exist over the last 30 years. 
As a result the supplier #1 IT service resources have high understanding and knowledge of the 
outsourcer domain, operational model, products and customers. The supplier #1 will provide a best 
fit on the required IT service design work for the outsourcer and can be seen as an advantage 
compared to other suppliers in the market. The activities carried out by the supplier #1 are 
telecommunication and IT service industry specific with additional skills on the outsourcer products, 
operating model and customers. 
4.1.2 Asset specificity 
The IT service design activity is the most critical element when creating a new service for the 
outsourcer and this will require a high level of knowledge of all systems, technologies, processes  and 
networks available within the outsourcer organization. High quality IT service designs in combination 
with a long term vision should result in efficient implementation of new services and the reduction of 
rework during implementation. All elements of services will need to be defined and thought through 
as part of the design phase as changes on design approach at a later stage will impact directly on the 
implementation duration, required resources and cost of projects. The asset specificity of the work 
can be graded as very high. 
There is a long lead time to introduce a new team member in to the IT service team. New resources 
will require training up to nine months of time before the outsourcer will be able to make full use of 
resource. This long lead time will create a high risk for both outsourcer and the supplier #1 as both 
need to be able to trust each other to invest that amount of time in one person before they become 
effective in the role.  
The IT service design offshore work for the outsourcer organization is carried out by two supplier 
organizations. The generic design role without  the outsourcer specific knowledge can be offshored 
to other suppliers. The work is therefore generic and can’t be qualified as unique. The outsourcer 
policy is to use two suppliers for filling in the design demand to reduce the risk of switching.  
4.1.3 Uncertainty 
By evolving technology the speed of change is high and faster than the implementation duration of 
new outsourcer services. Frequently the IT service team is faced with changing technology used on 
projects, even after that technology has matured over time. This will provide the IT service team with 
high levels of uncertainty during the execution of projects. The outsourcer is trying to control the 
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impact by using a governance model for implementing new services and projects. The designers 
within the IT service team will need to stay up to date in terms of upcoming technology of existing 
functionality but also brand new features. This is a generic challenge for all IT service resources 
engaged on these type of projects and not a specific uncertainty for the supplier #1 resources.  
The IT service team including the supplier #1 resources are impacted by design or requirement 
changes as part of service implementation projects. The changes within projects are captured and 
tracked as part of a change process managed by the change board within the outsourcer 
organization. The change board is the form to discuss risks and mitigated actions on a per project 
base and they deal with the uncertainty of the project execution. This is not a specific uncertainty 
towards the supplier #1 as this is a generic uncertainty for all IT service teams managed by the 
outsourcer. 
It is a challenge for the outsourcer and the supplier #1 to ensure the resources have the correct skills 
and level to perform the required tasks. Churn in the supplier #1 resources have a negative impact on 
the overall ability of the supplier #1 to deliver the required service as churn will result in loss of time 
and quality on projects. Table 7 will summarize the level of asset specificity and uncertainty within 
the supplier #1 IT service role. 
Table 7: 
IT Services activities 
IT Services   
Activity 
Supplier #1 IT service design activity  
 
Asset specificity 
Very high 
  
 
Uncertainty 
High uncertainty 
  
The IT service case showed the same level of asset specificity and uncertainty as identified with 
theoretical framework as shown in table 2 “IT Services and support activities”. In conclusion the asset 
specificity levels within the IT service case will have a potential impact on the offshore risks and 
require specific management control elements to reduce the risk for this activity.   
4.1.4 Offshoring risk due to unexpected transition and management costs 
The level of experience displayed by the supplier #1 within the IT service team is in line with the 
expected level from the outsourcer. The supplier #1 has a thirty year relationship with the outsourcer 
organization and there are no transitioning issues due to a potential new offshore relationship. The 
supplier #1 is an experienced organization performing offshore work.  
The outsourcer is applying result controls to measure the performance of supplier #1 against the 
quality of the delivered IT service designs and the level of churn in the supplier team. The outsourcer 
will be measuring the number of defects raised against the IT service design and timeline as part of 
the quality gates process and the level of churn over a specific period. The outsourcer is governing 
for on-time delivery via a wide range of quality gates as part of the implementation process and 
tracked by delivery managers managed by the outsourcer.  
The supplier #1 is performing according to the standards as agreed within the contract measures and 
there have been no major management or penalty costing associated with low performance due to a 
new offshore contract over the last twelve years as part of result controls in use by the outsourcer. 
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The IT service team can be impacted by legal environment issues around data integrity clauses of the 
outsourcer customer which can lead to uncertainty. The outsourcer is applying action controls to 
prevent behavior that can lead to legal environment issues. Suppliers will need to provide for specific 
employee accreditation to be able to support on these type of outsourcer customers. It is the 
responsibility of the supplier #1 to secure that the accreditations are in place for the people working 
in these areas. The legal restriction are included within the offshore contract between outsourcer 
and supplier #1. Other action control applicable for the supplier #1 are completion of all outsourcer 
mandatory training elements, rigorous access security policy as part of the offshore locations and 
apply to the values and ethics as defined by the outsourcer.  
4.1.5 Offshoring risk due to switching costs  
The level of asset specificity of the IT service offshore activities is very high as explained in chapter 
4.1.2 Asset specificity. The IT service role are required to work closely with key stakeholders in the 
operational team and in a product area in order to clarify future requirements from a technical, 
system, network and product perspective and determine potential issues and options for projects. 
Due to the highly complex nature of work the outsourcer will need to invest up to nine months in 
time and effort to bring a new supplier #1 IT service designer up to a level to be effective on projects. 
This time and effort is seen as a risk for the outsourcer in trusting the supplier #1 for the positive 
outcome aiming on cultural control of professional behavior and the drive for results and keeping 
promises by the supplier #1.  
The outsourcer is applying personnel controls to reduce the switching costs risk. The supplier will use 
a selection criteria’s as defined within the offshore contract for hiring new people within their 
organization before providing these resources over to the outsourcer. The responsibility for hiring 
additional resources are part of the supplier #1 duties. The outsourcer will check new supplier #1 
resources on their IT background, educational experience and other capabilities requested for the 
work via a short interview but there is a level of trust from the outsourcer that the supplier #1 will 
perform the educational, skillset and background check before a candidate will be put forward to the 
outsourcer. 
The generic IT service design role without the outsourcer specific knowledge can be offshored to 
other suppliers. The outsourcer preferred to use two suppliers for filling in the IT service design 
demand to reduce the risk of switching. A few years back the IT service team within the outsourcer 
organization only had an offshore contract with supplier #1. In order to reduce the switching cost risk 
and avoid supplier #1 service become unique for the outsourcer a second supplier have been added 
within the IT service team. Currently there are two suppliers including the supplier #1 providing the 
IT service activities to reduce the risk. The IT Service teams are currently based in Europe and India. 
The Indian teams are split over the outsourcer organization and two offshore suppliers as shown in 
fig. 2.  
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Fig 2: IT service team resource split  
To reduce the risk of switching cost in case supplier #1 steps out of the offshore relationship, 
contract controls are in place to arrange official knowledge transfer and a controlled transition over a 
number of months in to the new supplier. There are also technical back up arrangements in place 
within the IT service team of the outsourcer organization but they are not able to take over the 
complete workload currently carried out by supplier #1.   
The IT service design activity is an industry generic role and the role is carried out by both supplier 
organizations and the outsourcer design team. The design work currently offshored is also accessible 
via other suppliers outside the current offshore contract with an additional amount training of 
outsourcer specific knowledge. The outsourcer is controlling the risk of losing a specific skill or 
resources by using multiple suppliers. 
4.1.6 Offshoring risk due to costly contractual 
Technical shortfall and interruption of supplier resources have not been a challenge as part of the 
thirty years relationship between the outsourcer and supplier #1. This risk have been reduced as the 
supplier #1 have been building competence levels over time within the relationship to avoid issue in 
future. As a result the supplier is able to control the resource request out of the outsourcer by 
training the teams upfront before the demand is been requested by the outsourcer. Although new 
technology will show longer lead time compared to existing technology and skills, the outsourcer 
controls the potential issues such as delays in design timelines of technology or shortfalls in promised 
technical functionality via result control as explained in chapter 4.1.4 Offshoring risk due to 
unexpected transition and management cost.  
The IT service team highlighted high likelihood of small offshore contract changes but these will have 
low risk due to the minimum impact on the contract between outsourcer and supplier #1. The IT 
service team identifies the probability of significant changes on the contract as very small but if 
changes on the contract do occur the impact will be extremely high for the outsourcer. There are no 
examples of technological shortfalls or discontinuity within the offshore contract with the supplier #1 
over the last few years that altered the structure or content of the offshore contract during the 
execution.  
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4.1.7 Offshoring risk due to disputes and litigation 
The supplier #1 has a thirty year relationship with the outsourcer organization and has excellent 
experience working as an offshore agent organization. They have proven over these years to be an 
effective supplier based on the outcome of the measured performance on defects and timeline 
delivery of projects. The cultural way of working within the relationship have been blended into the 
supplier #1 IT service design team over time. There is no significant differences between the culture 
in both organizations in the execution of the activities as part of the offshore contract. The 
outsourcer is applying cultural control by monitoring and providing direction to the supplier #1 on 
location or near location in India.  
There have been no reports of cultural differences between outsourcer and agents that negatively 
impacted the offshore relationship but there is a likelihood of this type of risk within the design 
team. The risk is based on legal disputes on agreed level of skilled resources out of the supplier #1.  
Any legal disputes will be managed on the wider offshore contract by the legal and supplier 
management team within the outsourcer organization. Any potential dispute that might show up 
within the IT service teams will be escalated up to these two teams for resolving with the supplier #1. 
Content of the contract will be leading on the actions or penalty measures applied against the 
supplier #1.  
There are no examples of disputes and litigation within the offshore contract with the supplier #1 
over the last few years that have changes the structure or content of the offshore contract during the 
execution. 
 
4.1.8 Offshoring risk due to service debasement 
The level of experience and expertise of the supplier #1 within the offshore relationship between 
supplier # 1 and outsourcer exist over 30 and several years for this offshored design activity. There 
are no reports of general low performance from the outsourcer and generally most of the supplier #1 
team members meet the expectations. The outsourcer controls the potential issues of service 
debasement via result control such as measurements of the performance of supplier #1 against the 
agreed resource level and resource spare levels as part of the contract. 
The supplier #1 is able to provide sustainable size of resources to perform the IT service offshore 
work. The ability to provide sustainable amount of new resources is tested as part of the fluctuation 
of the demand on resources within IT service team. Over the year the level of resources required is 
changing and supplier #1 will need to be able to provide the outsourcer with the required and 
trained people. Any issues will be reported back in the outsourcer. In case of an issue to provide the 
necessary resource the outsourcer is also able to ask the other supplier to back fill the gap. The 
supplier # 1 resources are appointed by name within the contract but there are pools of resources 
available within the supplier #1 to cover sick leave or other absence of resources. This is captured as 
part of the offshore contract.  
The financial stability of supplier #1 can be qualified as good. This is checked as part of contract 
entry. The supplier #1 is a big company and it is well established as an organization supplying to the 
outsourcer as well as other organizations around the world. They have healthy interest in multiple 
industries. There is no reason to believe the financial stability will cause issues over the coming 
contract period.  
The task complexity is high for the IT service activities carried out by the supplier #1 as explained in 
chapter 4.1.2 Asset specificity.  
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4.1.9 Offshoring risk due to cost escalation and hidden service costs 
Factors leading to outsourcer escalation are unavailability of resources, poor quality of designs and 
delivery time issues on IT service designs which are captured via the regular calls as part of the 
governance control as explained in chapter 4.1.4 Offshoring risk due to unexpected transition and 
management costs. The IT service team will manage individual performance issues of supplier #1 
resources via personnel control. Performance improvements of troubled supplier #1 designers are 
difficult to be influenced by the IT service outsourcer. The outsourcer do not manager the supplier #1 
resources as the direct line manager and can’t make changes on the result control based reward 
schemas of the supplier #1 IT service designer. If the performance issues are persistent it can lead to 
the removal and replacement of the supplier #1 resource which will potentially cause delay in 
projects and additional time spent on training a new team member. It is more costly for the 
outsourcer if the supplier #1 resource will need to be removed and replaced by a new one as it will 
take up to nine months to learn the required skills.  
The outsourcer checks the outcome of delivery and the performance by the amount of defects or 
fixes required to implement a product or service as part of the IT service design work by applying 
result control as explained within chapter 4.1.4 Offshoring risk due to unexpected transition and 
management cost. The content of the performance measures will be updated yearly between the 
outsourcer and Supplier #1. Apart from these measurements the supplier #1 is using its own 
measures to check the performance of the design team. There are no reports of misuse or changing 
of this data to improve the measurement results by supplier #1. 
The speed of change is high when using brand new technology as part of projects and existing 
technology is also impacted by change over time. The IT service team is impacted by the level of 
change of technology. Resulting in high levels of uncertainty at the execution and implementation of 
design project potentially causing for escalation and additional time spend by the outsourcer and 
supplier #1. 
  
4.1.10 Offshoring risk due to loss of organizational competency 
The outsourcer is able to perform the scope and skills required for the IT service activities currently 
offshored into the supplier #1 and the risk of loss of outsourcer competence loss is low. The IT 
service team have managed the risk by the resource split over the teams as explained in chapter 
4.1.5 Offshoring risk due to switching costs. Although it is not possible to completely take over the 
workload of supplier #1 into the outsourcer organization, there is no lack of skills within the 
outsourcer organization. The current ratio outsourcer resource versus supplier offshore resource of 1 
to 10 must result in a high level of trust on the suppliers #1 by the outsourcer. 
In case supplier #1 want step out of the offshore contract it is mandatory for supplier #1 to provide 
an official knowledge transfer and a controlled transition over a number of months in to the new 
supplier as included within the offshore contract as explained in chapter 4.1.5 Offshoring risk due to 
switching costs. The likelihood of cancelation without transition support from supplier #1 is very low 
as the supplier #1 will face loss of reputation within the offshore market and certain elements in the 
contract will not permit immediate cancellation of contract without sever financial penalties for the 
leaving party.  There is also an element of trust the supplier #1 organization is financially healthy and 
will not go bankrupt or stop existing as that will provide a risk of loss of service as well as a loss off 
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potential penalty payment. The outsourcer is trusting the supplier #1 not to walk away from the 
offshore contract. 
To reduce the risk of loss of competence, the outsourcer resources within the IT service team will be 
kept in control of the strategic directions and will need to poses the necessary skills to perform all 
design tasks to avoid being vulnerable without supplier #1. The outsourcer is trying to keep a close 
relation with the supplier #1 to make sure there is no gap in their knowledge as well as in the 
activities carried out by the supplier #1.    
There is no loss of competence due to geographical distance. The geographical distance and the time 
zone difference are a challenge for this type of offshore relationship. However culturally the India 
resources start working later during the day compared to European countries. This requires a level of 
trust towards the supplier #1 to carry out the pre-work as part of their starting hours of the working 
day. As the effort is based on delivering a certain amount of quality IT service design document over 
a longer period, any deviation on work ethics will be managed via result controls as explained within 
chapter 4.1.4 Offshoring risk due to unexpected transition and management cost.  
The outsourcer is also controlling the geographical distance between supplier #1 and the outsourcer 
organization by using the current available technical features such as conference calls, skype for 
business, share point, video conferencing. 
Table 8: 
IT Services and support activities management controls per risk 
 IT Services 
Activity Supplier #1 design activity 
   
Risks impact 
 
Risk related to unexpected transition and 
management costs 
 
Risk related to switching cost 
 
 
Risk related to costly contractual changes 
 
Risks related to disputes and litigation 
 
Risks to service debasement 
 
High impact on loss of organizational 
competency risks  
 
 
High impact on Cost escalation and 
hidden service costs risks 
Management controls 
  
Result control (Define performance measures, measurement) 
 
 
Action control (Rewards/Incentives, Personal control, Behavioral 
constraints) Cultural control (trust) 
 
Result control (setting performance targets) 
 
Result control (setting performance targets) 
 
Personnel control (pre training selection) 
 
Cultural control (trust) 
Result control (Define and performance measures, target setting, measuring 
performance), Personnel control (outsourcer owned team) 
 
Result control (measuring performance, penalties by removal of resources) 
 
4.2 Case Offshore contract between outsourcer and supplier #1 business process 
proposition 
The outsourcer organization is a global company within the telecommunication and IT service 
industry. The business process team host the service design architects (SDA) responsible for the 
business process designs and business process workflow as part of the introduction of new or 
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enhanced services for the outsourcer organization. The SDA is role comparable with the business 
process activity. 
 
4.2.1 Offshore relationship 
The motivation to use an offshore contract within the business process team is based on two 
reasons. Firstly the global spread of the business process team members in order to support the 
global introduction of new or updated services worldwide. The delivery teams which are using the 
implemented outsourcer services are located globally from Japan to America and by offshoring the 
business process work from India and Europe, team coverage can be supported during all office 
hours of the delivery teams. The second reason for offshoring business process work in to supplier #2 
is the reduction of resource cost due to the lower rates used in India compared to West European 
countries. 
The suppliers play all roles available within the business process team on the exception of the lead 
design role. These are carried out by outsourcer employees.  
4.2.2 Asset specificity 
The business process function is a technical role on which experience on the outsourcer products, 
systems and processes is key in order to perform as expected within this role. Any new supplier #2 
resources will need to be trained via a training program run within the supplier #2 organization on 
the industry specific elements of the business process role. Once the training is finished the new 
team members understand the basic processes, products and methods but they are still ‘green’ from 
an outsourcer perspective.  
Key element of the business process role is based on specific services, system and process 
information which can’t be trained by courses alone. In the first months new team members within 
the supplier #2 will be coached to complete their set of skills before they will be running solo. This 
knowledge will need to be learned on the job. This coached time is important to learn the outsourcer 
specific information. 
The supplier #2 business process activities are not unique. There is one other supplier beside supplier 
#2 that provides the business process service to the outsourcer organization and there are other 
suppliers in the offshore market to supply the business process role. However each new supplier will 
need to build up their knowledge on the outsourcer services and processes.  
 
4.2.3 Uncertainty 
The outsourcer has a tendency to use new technology to build future services. Projects to introduce 
new outsourcer services will make use of new technology which will take a longer time to complete 
implementation compared to projects using existing technology. This will provide a level of 
uncertainty in the planning of projects. The supplier #2 team members will need to facilitate that 
their business process resource learn about these new technology or features. This type of 
uncertainty is an outsourcer wide issue and not specific to this supplier #2 relationship.  
Uncertainty in terms of how fast technology can change is one degree of uncertainty that can impact 
the execution of the business process role. For example the IT service technology used within the 
projects changes fast and frequently. It is important to keep the existing services and process up to 
date which impact the business process role in its execution of new work.   
Frequent change of requirements on projects supported by the business process team will have an 
impact on business process designs in execution and business process designs which have been 
completed. Requirement changes have negative impacted on the quality of business process 
document as well as the duration to deliver these elements for the business process team. 
Uncertainty of requirements will directly impact on the level of resources required within the 
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business process team. Technological uncertainty is not seen as major issue within the business 
process team. 
 
Table 9: 
IT Services activities 
Business process   
Activity  
Business process design activity 
 
  
Asset specificity 
Medium 
 
  
Uncertainty 
Medium uncertainty 
  
The business processes case showed the same level of asset specificity and uncertainty as identified 
with theoretical framework as shown in table 2 “IT Services and support activities”. In conclusion the 
asset specificity levels within the business processes case will have a potential impact on the offshore 
risks and require specific management control elements to reduce the risk for this activity.   
4.2.4 Offshoring risk due to unexpected transition and management costs 
Supplier #2 was added six months ago as the second supplier working within the business process 
team. The offshore relationship between the outsourcer and supplier #2 have been reported to be a 
challenge for the first few months of the contract. To reduce the risk of transition cost the outsourcer 
have provided the outsourcer specific services, processes and system information as part of the 
handover. This element of knowledge share and transitions is being included as part of the offshore 
contract including a disclosure agreement for the shared information. The business process role 
specific knowledge will need to build up in the next few months. The level of knowledge share for a 
technical contract is currently high. 
The level of experience displayed by the supplier #2 is not yet in line with the expected level from the 
outsourcer. There are communication issues between supplier #2 and the outsourcer organization 
due to the differences in performance within supplier #2 resources. However the head of business 
process team from the outsourcer organization trust that over time supplier #2 will be able to 
perform on the same level as the other supplier used within the business process team.  
The outsourcer is applying result control method to manage the relationship via measures as agreed 
within a fixed price offshore contract agreement with the supplier #2. There are Key performance 
Indicators (KPI’s) measures as defined within the offshore contract. The KPI’s include measurements 
against delivery to time, delivery to quality and outsourcer customer satisfaction scores. As part of 
governance control the measures are discussed on the service model approval board on a weekly 
basis. Other measuring types have been investigated by the outsourcer over a few years but the KPI’s 
in combination with the board sessions with all stakeholders is currently seen as the most effective 
way to manage the offshored business process team activities. The supplier #2 and its resources are 
accountable for achieving the performance standards as agreed within the offshore contract which 
are periodically checked as part of the outsourcer governance process for the business process team. 
In case the supplier #2 falls below the KPI threshold, as defined within the offshore contract, there 
will be financial penalties towards the supplier #2. However the outsourcer line manager within the 
business process team have no control over the rewards of supplier #2 resources. Issues on the 
performance of individual supplier #2 resources will be directed to the line manager within the 
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supplier #2 ultimately leading to the removal or replacement of a supplier #2 resource. It is the 
responsibility of supplier #2 to coach the resource for improvements. 
The new relationship between supplier #2 and the outsourcer is loosely managed to allow the 
supplier #2 to learn for a period of time. Hence the expected levels of support delivered by the 
supplier #2 have not been measured to the full extend. Beside the contractual performance the 
supplier is also checked against the progress on transition as supplier in the business process team. 
This results in additional outsourcer management time and cost spend on nurturing this offshore 
relationship with supplier #2.  
As the supplier #2 has already engaged with the outsourcer organization with other types of roles 
the majority of legal environment uncertainty have been included within the contracts as part of 
cultural control to improve mutual monitoring and elements such as codes of conducts, physical 
arrangements and social arrangements. No additional elements of uncertainty have been added in 
the contract for the business process offshore contract. 
4.2.5 Offshoring risk due to switching costs  
The resources within supplier #2 will need to be technically qualified with either an engineering 
degree or a graduate in a science degree. The level of asset specificity is high for this role. The 
outsourcer preferred to use two suppliers for this role to reduce the risk of switching. By the 
introduction of the supplier #2 as the second offshore contract supplier, the outsourcer aims to 
reduce the impact on the general business process workload in case one of the  suppliers terminates 
the offshore contract. The business process teams are currently based in Europe and India. The 
Indian teams are split over the  two offshore suppliers as shown in fig. 3. Even though the outsourcer 
is working with two suppliers, the switching costs risk is still significantly high as the supplier #2 is still 
a small sized team compared to the order supplier.  
 
Fig 3: Business process team resource split 
There are no indications that the current two suppliers will be replaced. Replacing a supplier will take 
a considerate amount of time as it requires tendering for the role, contract negotiation, checks if 
suppliers are able to take on the work and possess the skills and resources. This will add to the risk of 
switching away from one of the existing supplier hence there is a level of a trust a supplier will not 
just walk away even though a period of transition is included as part of the contract in case of 
contract termination.  
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There are no specific skills or people that can be quantified as unique within business process work 
as the activity can be rated industry specific and not company specific. By having the skills available 
within the outsourcer organization as well as within two suppliers the outsourcer is mitigating the 
risk of switching costs. 
The supplier #2 organization was founded seven years ago and they are active within the general 
offshoring market for multiple outsourcer organization in different roles. In order to gain skills and 
additional team size the suppler #2 have tried to contract some of the business process resources 
from the other supplier within the business process team. The outsourcer is applying action controls 
to restrict suppliers to use this behavior via the outsourcer values and as part offshore contract.  
Separation of duties is only needed within an offshore contract if this is required as part of a 
customer contract data integrity clause. The separation of duties is required to avoid uncertainties 
about the legal environment for the outsourcer. The outsourcer is applying action controls via 
systems restriction to avoid information leaving the European Economic area. The suppliers are not 
able to access these system holding that type of data and the work will be carried out by an 
outsourcer resource instead.  
It is important for the outsourcer to make use of the right skilled and experienced resources in the 
offshore relationship but with the fix price offshore contract the supplier #2 owns the responsibility 
for the hiring new resources within their teams. The outsourcer is applying personnel control to 
reduce the switching costs risk of individual churn by defining a minimum set of criteria’s to which 
new resources will need to be recruited. This includes skill sets, academic levels and experience in 
the business process field. The supplier #2 is responsible for maintaining these minimum criteria’s for 
persons working within this offshore contract. 
On top of the selection criteria set by the outsourcer, there are also a set of mandatory product, 
process, system and legal and regulatory courses which will need to be completed to be able to carry 
out the business process work. The additional training requirements are included within the offshore 
contract and are the responsibility of the supplier #2 organization to complete these successfully and 
maintain record of the progress and completion. 
4.2.6 Offshoring risk due to costly contractual 
The offshore contract between the outsourcer organization and the supplier #2 allows for midterm 
contract changes. There have been no example of this type of change during the execution of the 
offshore contract as result of technical shortfall within the supplier #2. There have been some 
changes on the contract to reflect an increase on the level of resources supporting the outsourcer as 
a result of the good performance from supplier #2. The performance was managed by the outsourcer 
via result control as explained in chapter 4.2.4 Offshoring risk due to unexpected transition and 
management costs. There is a growing trust from the outsourcer organization in the service provided 
by supplier #2.  
Within the business process offshore relationship result control and trust are available to control the 
good outcome of the offshore contract. The contract and the hard measures are combined with non-
measurable elements such as the cultural control trust and openness as part of the regular calls 
between outsourcer and supplier #2 team. The most emphasis is based on the measurements as part 
of the contract compared to the non-measurable elements of control. However the non-measurable 
elements will provide a better result and trust will grow over time once the offshore relationship 
matures between the outsourcer and the supplier #2 as stated by the business process outsourcer 
VP. 
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4.2.7 Offshoring risk due to disputes and litigation 
All business process resources from the supplier #2 can carry out work for that role except where 
customer or European restrictions prohibits the use of offshoring resources for the activities or data. 
As part of the contract there are access restrictions for the supplier #2 resources to support the 
disclosure of data and data integrity clauses as set by the outsourcer within the offshore contract. 
Potential issues are handled via separation of duties between the outsourcer and the supplier #2 to 
avoid legal issues as part of the offshore contract. The outsourcer is applying action control in the 
form of behavioral constraints and punishments of supplier #2 to avoid breadth of the offshore 
contract and to avoid offshoring risk due to disputes and litigation with outsourcer customers or the 
European Union. 
The outsourcer is applying behavioral constraints as part of action control to avoid migration of 
resource between the two suppliers as explained in chapter 4.2.5 Offshoring risk due to switching 
costs. There are no reports of uncertainty about the legal environment that resulted in a disputed 
between the outsourcer and the supplier #2. There are no reports of cultural difference that 
negatively impact the offshore relationship between the outsourcer and the supplier #2 as there are 
no specific cultural behaviors which differ from the one displayed within the outsourcer organization 
and people within the business process role. If either legal environment issues caused by uncertainty 
or cultural difference shows up the contract agreement will be the leading to control this issue.  
The outsourcer is applying personnel control to reduce the level of disputes and litigation risk caused 
by inadequate supplier #2 resources. There are two levels of checks performed by the outsourcer, 
firstly a check if the thorough background check have been performed by the  supplier #2 before 
accessing the outsourcer systems, secondly an information disclosure section have been added in to 
the offshore contract signed by supplier #2 organization and the individual supplier #2 resources. 
4.2.8 Offshoring risk due to service debasement 
There are reports of communication issues between supplier #2 and the outsourcer organization and 
the level of experience and expertise of supplier#2 is still growing as explained in chapter 4.2.4 
Offshoring risk due to unexpected transition and management costs. The head of business process 
team from the outsourcer organization trust that supplier #2 is able to level with the other supplier 
used in the business process team. 
As part of the service level offshore contract it is hard to tell how much resources are used to provide 
the agreed service levels as this is within the control of the supplier #2. The outsourcer will need to 
have a level of trust that the supplier #2 will deliver the activities as agreed within the offshore 
contract as explained in chapter 4.2.4 Offshoring risk due to unexpected transition and management 
costs. Overloading of people due to non-sustainable resources levels will be spotted due to the 
inability to deliver on time and with lower quality.  
The supplier #2 has a business continuity and backup plan in place as this is a prerequisite as part of 
the offshore contract with the outsourcer organization. The content of this business continuity plan 
is checked regularly by the outsourcer organization. The sustainable size of the supplier #2 
organization is linked in to the demand of work from the outsourcer. The level of services is captured 
as part of the contract and will be changed over the year if required. 
The financial stability of supplier #2 can be qualified as good. The financial stability check is handled 
via the offshore contract between the supplier #2 and the outsourcer organization via a outsourcer 
procurement team. There are checks on organizational level to confirm supplier #2 financial status 
and stability. 
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The business process task complexity and asset specificity is high as explained in chapter 4.2.2 Asset 
specificity. New supplier resources will need to be trained via a training program run within the 
supplier #2 organization. The new members will need to grow experience in a period of six months 
with support from the outsourcer due to the lack of in house training documentation as described in 
chapter 4.2.4 Offshoring risk due to unexpected transition and management costs. 
4.2.9 Offshoring risk due to cost escalation and hidden service costs 
Lack of experience and expertise can lead to supplier #2 escalation as part of outsourcer governance 
control. The quality gate process in use within the business process team will spot the issue of lack of 
expertise and experience. If supplier #2 resources miss the necessary skill such as the ability to 
challenge people, to speak out and be vocal on calls or lacking ability to understand the context of 
the work, this will be escalated within the supplier #2 organization via the line manager. This will lead 
to additional time spent by the outsourcer management team and potential extra work for a 
replacement outsourcer resource to complete the work. In case of replacement of the troubled 
supplier #2 resource a new training and coaching effort will be required by the outsourcer.  
Offshoring activities can be impacted by languages and clarification issues. Explaining issues within 
the boundaries of the same country will not likely cause differences in understanding the used 
language. Working with different countries speaking different languages tends to cause translation 
issue on phrases and details. The outsourcer have added in an additional layer of clarity in the ask or 
questions to avoid escalation of these type of issues.   
Quality of business process work is a main element of uncertainty which is a main factor of 
outsourcer escalation. This is managed by the outsourcer via a governance control model of quality 
gates throughput the business process work as explained within the chapter 4.2.3 Uncertainty. 
Changes within the overarching projects can also lead to uncertainty which ultimately can lead to 
project escalation due to extension of projects timelines.  
The periodic review sessions on which the performance of the suppliers is measured is used by the 
outsourcer organization. This way errors are spotted early to avoid errors to grow in to big problems 
and resulting in major escalation. There are specific measures included within the offshore contract 
to measure the performance as part of result control as explained within chapter 4.2.4 Offshoring 
risk due to unexpected transition and management costs. 
4.2.10 Offshoring risk due to loss of organizational competency 
Resources from the outsourcer organization are still able to perform the scope and skills required for 
the business process role due to the sizing balance between outsourcer and offshore resources. The 
current team size balance of outsourcer/supplier is 45%/55% as shown in chapter 4.2.5 Offshoring 
risk due to switching costs. The potential loss of skills will be controlled by keeping a percentage of 
the business process role within the outsourcer organization. This balance would be enough to avoid 
a decrease of skills within the outsourcer business process resources however the preferred ratio 
would be 50%/50%. The outsourcer organization is able to perform the business process role well 
and is not vulnerable by offshoring parts of the work to suppliers currently. This is controlled by 
keeping the ratios close to the preferred 50%/50% range. 
One of the objective of the business process team is to have team coverage from the Asia start of 
working day until the closure of the working day in west coast of America. The geographical distance 
between the different teams is an advantages for the outsourcer organization as it will enlarge the 
global coverage of the business process team to support the global outsourcer organization and the 
distance is not seen as risk. This will cause problem in having team calls or project calls as there is 
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very limited time where nearly all teams can join in at the same time. This results in a flexible start 
and end time within Asia and west coast America to overlap. Even though there is little overlap the 
teams are working together well. Not only due to the ability to measure the performance but also 
trusting the abilities of the supplier #2 team to deliver the required results without having a business 
process lead available during the bigger parts of the day. The communication between supplier team 
and outsourcer team is handled via email and conference calls which is commonly used within global 
organizations. 
 
Table 10: 
IT Services and support activities management controls per risk 
 IT Services 
Activity Supplier #2 design activity 
Risks impact 
 
Risk related to unexpected transition and 
management costs 
 
Risk related to switching cost 
 
 
 
Risk related to costly contractual changes 
 
Risks related to disputes and litigation 
 
Risks to service debasement 
 
 
High impact on loss of organizational 
competency risks  
 
 
High impact on Cost escalation and 
hidden service costs risks 
Management controls 
  
Result control (Define performance measures, measurement) 
 
 
Cultural control (trust), Action control (Penalties, Personal control, 
Behavioral constraints), Result control (Define performance measures, 
measurement) 
 
Result control (setting performance targets) 
 
Result control (setting performance targets) 
 
Cultural control (trust) 
Result control (setting performance targets) 
 
Cultural control (trust) 
Result control (Define and performance measures, target setting, measuring 
performance), Personal control (training) 
 
Result control (measuring performance, penalties) 
 
4.3 Case Offshore contract between outsourcer and supplier #3 customer delivery 
and care proposition 
The outsourcer organization is a global company within the telecommunication and IT service 
industry. The customer delivery organization within the outsourcer organization is responsible for 
the ordering and installation of the outsourcer services. The supplier #3 customer delivery team 
based in India is managed by the outsourcer lead based in India. The outsource customer delivery 
team lead is based in India to monitor the performance of the offshored delivery activities provided 
by the supplier #3. The type of activity can be categorized in the customer delivery and care 
activities. 
4.3.1 Offshore relationship 
The motivation to use an offshore relationship for the customer delivery role is based on cost 
reduction to deliver the service, accessibility to specific skills and the ability to deliver the outsourcer 
services in a global area from Asia up to the American time-zone from Monday till Saturday. The long 
term offshore relationship between the outsourcer and supplier #3 exists for over ten years. 
Originally the predecessor of supplier #3 provided the delivery work within the home country of the 
42 
 
outsourcer. Due to cost efficiency targets the customer delivery activities have been moved over to 
India. Over time supplier #3 have replaced the original supplier due to lower cost and better service. 
4.3.2 Asset specificity  
The customer delivery organization provides the installation of outsourcer services globally. Roles 
which can be distinguished are order managers, who organize the customer order and which don’t 
require high technical knowledge, network specialists who work closely with third party supplier as 
part of the order journey which requires a midrange level of technical knowledge and configuration 
engineers responsible for the complex customer network configuration task of order who are the 
high end technical knowledge assets. The order managers and network specialist are more 
commonly available resource but there is a shortage of skilled configuration engineers resulting in 
high cost due to the shortage. The supplier #3 teams support the outsourcer customers out of 
Europe and America. In order to run customer delivery activities, the supplier #3 resources will need 
to complete the list of outsourcer mandatory trainings before performing these tasks.  
The activities carried out by the supplier #3 are industry based. There are a number of suppliers in 
India capable of delivering the same service as supplier #3 and the outsourcer organization is also 
able to perform the customer delivery activities.  
Most of the activities within the delivery organization are routine activities except for the 
configuration engineer activity which can be compared with the IT service designer role. The supplier 
#3 is responsible to train their own resources as part of the offshore contract. The total duration of 
training for a new supplier #3 employee is about six weeks followed by a four week on the job 
training period supported by an experienced supplier #3 resource and finalized with a readiness 
assessment before being accredited to work for the outsourcer.  
The supplier #3 work is not unique and can be obtained from multiple other suppliers. However 
supplier #3 unique selling point is the ten years of experience working for the outsourcer 
organization and understanding process, products and the outsourcer culture.    
4.3.3 Uncertainty 
The performance for the customer delivery organization is based on achieving on time delivery of 
customer orders. Unavailability of the system supporting the customer delivery team have a direct 
impact on these performance measures. System issues and unavailability is key element of 
uncertainty for the supplier #3 and the outsourcer delivery organization. 
Systems in use for the customer delivery team are frequently updated and new services will be 
introduced within the team. The level of uncertainty for the changes will be mitigate by running 
operational test within the outsourcer and supplier #3 organization prior to the launch of the system 
and service changes. 
The offshore relationship within the customer delivery team can cause uncertainty in the 
performance of the team. Factors which will need to be addressed to avoid uncertainty on the 
execution of offshore activities are: (1) are there customer restrictions which prevent the offshoring 
of the activity in to India using supplier #3 resources, (2)will the drive for cost efficiency due to the 
use of an offshore contract with supplier #3 result in lower levels of service provided to the 
outsourcer customers, (3) will the offshore relationship increase the risk for security or data integrity 
issues of the outsourcer customers. 
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Table 11: 
IT Services activities 
Service Delivery of outsourcer services   
Activity  
Customer delivery activity  
 
Asset specificity 
Low (except the role configuration engineer High) 
  
 
Uncertainty 
Medium uncertainty 
  
The customer delivery and care case showed the same level of asset specificity and uncertainty as 
identified with theoretical framework as shown in table 2 “IT Services and support activities”. In 
conclusion the asset specificity levels within the customer delivery and care case will have a potential 
impact on the offshore risks and require specific management control elements to reduce the risk for 
this activity.   
4.3.4 Offshoring risk due to unexpected transition and management costs 
The level of experience display by the supplier # 3 team is in general as agreed within the offshore 
contract. However there is a variation of supplier #3 performance over this ten years. The outsourcer 
organization is applying result control to measure the performance of the supplier #3. For each of the 
customer delivery activities key performance indicators main measurement drivers have been 
identified to achieve a successful offshore relationship. These indicators are baselined and targeted 
and reported on a weekly base within the different teams. Performance problems will be discussed 
as part of governance control between the outsourcer and the supplier #3 in order to take corrective 
actions and when these will need to be restored to the targets.  
The operational measures as part of the offshore contract with supplier #3 are cycle time and on 
time deliver as high level measures for of the service delivery functions, backlog measures on tasks 
level, utilization and productivity measures based on the time and materials offshore contract, churn 
and retention on key personnel.  
In case of experience issues or customer complaints with individual team members of supplier #3 the 
line managers will be notified of issues by the outsourcer to take corrective actions as part of the 
supplier #3 owned HR process. Only in case of sever misbehavior the outsourcer can request an 
immediate cancellation of the employee to support the outsourcer. Generally this type of issues is 
coming from the result measuring over time or via a customer complaint. Teams and employees of 
the supplier are accountable for the performance of their work as part of the offshore activities. 
However there is no reward or penalty system available to influence their behavior.  
Supplier #3 have more than ten years of experience on offshore services and have offshore contracts 
with multiple global outsourcer organization. The level of offshore experience of supplier #3 have 
been investigate as part of the contract negotiation but have not been questioned during the 
contract execution and the current offshore contract will likely be renewed by the outsourcer as part 
of cultural control to improve mutual monitoring and elements such as codes of conducts, physical 
arrangements and social arrangements. There are legal constrains supporting specific customer due 
to data integrity clauses between the outsourcer customer and the outsourcer as part of action 
control as explained within chapter 4.3.3 Uncertainty.  
4.3.5 Offshoring risk due to switching costs  
Roles which can be distinguished within the customer delivery team are order managers, network 
specialists and configuration engineers responsible as explained within chapter 4.3.2 Asset 
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specificity. Due to the high competitiveness of the labor market in India, employees of all three roles 
tend to move around from suppliers frequently in their search for improvements leading to switching 
cost as a result of churn. The churn rates are measured as part of result controls as explained within 
chapter 4.3.4 Offshoring risk due to unexpected transition and management costs. To control the 
churn the offshore contract supplier #3 will need to notify any resource changes one month prior to 
the move or leave. Also the supplier will need to have certain level of fully trained spare resources 
available as a buffer to fill in gaps directly to reduce the potential service loss for the outsourcer as 
identified with the offshore contract.  
There are key people on the offshore contract within service delivery management roles who have a 
lot of experience which will cause a risk if they are no longer available for the outsourcer. This risk of 
loss of key resources is mitigated by naming specific individuals within the offshore contract to avoid 
replacement within the supplier #3 organization also this risk will be lowered by having enough 
management in place to be less impacted by changes of key people.  
There is a risk of supplier #3 to step out of the offshore contract with the outsourcer. This is 
mitigated by ensuring the low level process documentation is kept up to date to secure the 
knowledge within the outsourcer organization. Beside the supplier #3 contract there are also 
outsourcer delivery teams in other countries to reduce the risk of a single supplier. These are 
measure as part of a disaster recovery plan but they are not sized enough to fully replace all work 
carried out by the supplier #3. 
Although many suppliers out of India provide this type of offshore services only supplier #3 is 
currently running the delivery team offshore contract for the outsourcer. There are delivery 
organization available within the outsourcer organization based in Europe and America but they are 
not able to take over all the workload due lack of size. Beside the supplier #3 contract there are also 
outsourcer delivery teams in other countries to reduce the risk of a single supplier as shown in fig. 4.  
 
Fig 4: Customer delivery team resource split 
There is outsourcer trust that supplier #3 will not cancel the customer delivery offshore contract as 
part of reputation element and that they want to retain the wider contract with the outsourcer 
organization which is wider than just the customer delivery organization. Also there is a cancellation 
clause within the offshore contract detailing the penalties and the supplier #3 responsibility to hand 
over the knowledge and skills in case of contract termination.  
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4.3.6 Offshoring risk due to costly contractual 
The outsourcer and supplier #3 currently running negotiations on a new offshore contract. This will 
initialize a changes of the costing model used within the contract from a time and resource model 
into a fixed service model. This is not a result of shortfalls or lack of performance or commitment 
from the supplier #3. During the current contract execution no changes have been applied to the 
contract as well.  
An increase of the complexity of the tasks performed by the supplier #3 will require more control 
from the outsourcer and a high trust of relationship between both parties. The outsourcer control for 
the customer delivery organization is a combination of control on results via the measured key 
performance indicators as well as cultural control element trust in the supplier #3. The balance 
between trust and result control is depending on the individual outsourcer managers way of working. 
However the main focus will be on measuring the results as suppliers in general can be seen as a 
profit center trying to make money from this offshore contract. From the senior management 
perspective it is more focused on trust but the lower organization levels will more focus on the 
measurements. 
The introduction of new services within the service delivery area can result in an increase of 
complexity for example due to the use of new system and process. This can result in changes on the 
offshore contract including changes of the performance indicators. Currently the complexity of the 
customer delivery activities are low as explained in chapter 4.3.3 Uncertainty.  
 
4.3.7 Offshoring risk due to disputes and litigation 
The level of outsourcing experience of supplier #3 is good as explained in chapter 4.3.4 Offshoring 
risk due to unexpected transition and management costs. There are legal constrains supporting 
specific customers due to data integrity clauses between the outsourcer customers and the 
outsourcer as explained within chapter 4.3.3 Uncertainty. These measures are included within the 
offshore contract with the supplier #3. All the KPI’s are currently included in the contract to avoid 
potential disputes.  
Everybody working for the outsourcer organization will have to work according to the guidelines and 
access regulations. This will be trained via mandatory computer based training. The supplier #3 team 
leads and employee need to complete these regular and are held accountable for that action as part 
of action controls from the outsourcer. The outsourcer will run audits to confirm the supplier #3 
behaves according to the agreements of the offshore contract. No reports of this type of issues have 
been seen over the last few years. In case this shows up the legal team will review the actions as 
included in the offshore contract. 
There are no reports of cultural difference that resulted negatively impact the offshore relationship 
between the outsourcer and the supplier #2 even though each location has its own culture. In order 
to manage the expectation the outsourcer organization has appointed an outsourcer resource to 
work within the supplier #3 office to reduce potential cultural issues. 
The offshore contract contains an option to recall the content of the arrangement in case of 
continues under performance of supplier #3. However this has not happened over the duration of 
the contract with supplier #3. 
4.3.8 Offshoring risk due to service debasement 
The level of experience display by the supplier # 3 team in line with the offshore contract. Individual 
team members issues will be reported to the supplier #3 line manager as explained in chapter 4.3.4 
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Offshoring risk due to unexpected transition and management costs. Low number of supplier #3 
resources and skills can have a direct service impact on the outsourcer customers. As part of result 
control the outsourcer identified a buffer of resources which the supplier will need to have in 
available and fully trained in case of issues. This list of supplier #3 resources working on the buffer list 
are reported to the outsourcer line managers on a monthly base to reduce the risk of understaffing.  
To keep a sustainable size the supplier #3 will need to have a disaster recovery plan in place as part 
of the offshore contract to sustain service in case of an issue on one of their locations. Financially 
there no indications of issues reported on supplier #3 which can impact the level of service provided. 
Stability clauses are included within the offshore contract to control this risk for the outsourcer. The 
majority of the work carried out are project managers’ activities which is low complexity work as 
explained in chapter 4.3.2 Asset specificity. 
4.3.9 Offshoring risk due to cost escalation and hidden service costs 
There a number of factors which can result in supplier #3 escalations. There are measurement and 
KPI’s failing escalations and customer complaint escalation on timeline, service levels and behavioral 
issue escalations. In many occasions escalations are initiated by impatient outsourcer customers on 
their order progress even if the service is delivered as specified. Each of these issues will need to be 
reviewed. There are formal measures, as explained in chapter 4.3.4 Offshoring risk due to 
unexpected transition and management costs , and an escalation processes is in place within the 
customer delivery organization as part of result control. The overall performance reports will be 
discussed on senior management between both parties.   
As the orders are delivered globally, parts of the services are delivered by third parties. This 
uncertainty is one of the biggest issue resulting in escalation from the outsourcer customers. The 
supplier is held responsible to report this as part of the third party escalation and ask support from 
the outsourcer senior managers if needed to avoid customer order delays.  
The ordering process used by the supplier #3 resources drives the users to fill in commitment dates 
at certain steps in the process. Previously this was more free format, leading to incorrect 
measurements and fabricated dates. By using the date management policy, this is no longer an issue 
for the outsourcer organization. 
It is important for the outsourcer to use the right key employee in the offshore. The supplier # 3 will 
carry out check to confirm they have the necessary skills, reference checked, education levels and 
don’t have a criminal record on the individual team members. The specification for the role will be 
determined by the outsourcer organization for each role as part of personnel control. The supplier #3 
is owning a pool of people trained and ready to backfill gaps. Some roles only require a basic training 
and level skills to perform these task for example the installation coordinators, others will require 
much more training and pre-existing certificates and skills.  
The level of experience display by the supplier # 3 team and resources are in general as agreed within 
the offshore contract as explained in chapter 4.3.4 Offshoring risk due to unexpected transition and 
management costs.  
 
4.3.10  Offshoring risk due to loss of organizational competency 
There is no significant loss of skills and scope within the outsourcer organization due to the 
outsourcing of the customer delivery activities. Beside the supplier #3 contract there are also 
outsourcer delivery teams in other countries to reduce the risk of a single supplier and potential loss 
of skills and scope in the outsourcer organization. The creation of the processes and work 
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instructions are performed by the outsourcer to avoid the same loss. Most of the customer delivery 
activities are carried out by both outsourcer and supplier #3 teams. However the outsourcer 
customer delivery team is not sized to take on the workload carried out by the supplier #3 team 
currently. 
Each location has its own culture. In order to manage the expectation the outsourcer organization 
has appointed a manager to work within the supplier #3 office to reduce potential cultural issues as 
part of cultural control. As the relationship exist over ten years now the level of trust and hard 
measures show the supplier #3 is able to provide the results as agreed within the contract. 
Part of the customer delivery knowledge is currently stored at the supplier #3. Currently the 
outsourcer is rebuilding the knowledge documents and re-establish the control over these files. This 
will limit the amount of trust the outsourcer will need to put on the supplier #3 as the knowledge is 
back in its own organization. However the processes do not always describe the full level of skills and 
methods used by the key resources within the supplier #3 organization, which can be seen as a loss 
of competence for the outsourcer organization. This risk is controlled by the availability of outsourcer 
owned customer delivery team and the use of business process designers documented processes and 
low level work-instruction for each of the outsourcer services. 
 
The outsourcer organization has allocated a resources within the supplier office to make sure the 
issues will be controlled on site and not over distance. This to avoid loss off service and performance. 
The onsite availability will lead to more transparency between the two parties.   
 
Table 12: 
IT Services and support activities management controls per risk 
 IT Services 
Activity Supplier #3 service design activity 
Risks impact 
Risk related to unexpected transition and 
management costs 
 
Risk related to switching cost 
 
 
Risk related to costly contractual changes 
 
 
Risks related to disputes and litigation 
 
 
Risks to service debasement 
 
High impact on loss of organizational 
competency risks  
 
 
High impact on Cost escalation and    
hidden service costs risks 
Management controls 
Result control (Define performance measures, measurement), Cultural 
control (trust at senior management level) 
 
Action control (Penalties, Personal control, Behavioral constraints), Result 
control (Define performance measures, measurement) 
 
Action control (Behavioral constraints), Result control (setting performance 
targets) 
 
Action control (Behavioral constraints), Result control (setting performance 
targets, measurement) 
 
Result control (contractual, target setting) 
 
Cultural control (trust) 
Result control (Define and performance measures, target setting, measuring 
performance), Personal control (training) 
 
Result control (measuring performance, penalties) 
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5 Discussion 
This chapter presents the empirical evidence and the implications that can be drawn from this 
evidence in comparison with the theoretical framework. The discussion is based on the theoretical 
framework as shown in Table 5 “IT Services and support activities management control per risk” 
which summarizes the risks of each of the three cases from chapter 2 and the empirical evidence 
found within the outsourcer organization for each of the three cases available within chapter 4. 
Firstly the empirical elements supporting the theoretical framework will be discussed. Secondly the 
empirical elements contradicting with the theoretical framework will be reviewed and explained 
what caused the deviation from the theoretical framework and specific new finding will be reviewed 
and explained against the current context of the research case.   
5.1 Supporting elements of the theoretical and empirical evidence 
The three conducted case studies for (1) IT service, (2) Business process within IT area and (3) 
customer delivery and care center activities have shown a high level of similarity between the 
theoretical framework and the empirical evidence based on Table 5 “IT Services and support 
activities management control per risk”. 
The results of the theoretical and empirical synthesis is available in table 13 Theoretical and empirical 
synthesis of IT services and support activities. The synthesis of the theoretical framework and 
empirical evidence as part of the table 13 will display the comparable elements and the contrasting 
elements for both. The theoretical framework elements are shown without brackets in the table. In 
case the theoretical framework elements are discovered as part of empirical evidence, these 
elements are shown as plain text in the table. In case theoretical framework elements are not 
discovered as part of empirical evidence, these elements have been striped through in the table and 
in case empirical evidence elements do not show up as part of theoretical framework, these 
elements have been placed between brackets. 
Table 13: 
Theoretical and empirical synthesis of IT Services and support activities management controls per risk 
 IT Services Business Processes Customer delivery and 
care centers 
Activity    
 Design Business process design  Service delivery 
Risks impact Management controls   
Risk related to 
unexpected transition 
and management costs 
 
Result control (Define 
performance measures, 
Rewards/Incentives*
1
, 
Measurement) 
[Not identified as risk.] 
Result control (Define 
performance measures, 
Rewards/Incentives*
1
, 
Measurement) 
 
 
Risk related to switching 
cost 
 
Cultural control (trust), Action 
control (Rewards/Incentives, 
Personal control, Behavioral 
constraints) 
[Additional: Result control 
(setting performance targets) 
and Governance control *
2
] 
Cultural control (trust), Action 
control (Rewards/Incentives, 
Personal control, Behavioral 
constraints) 
[Additional: Result control 
(setting performance targets) 
and Governance control *
2
] 
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Risk related to costly 
contractual changes 
 
Action control (Behavioral 
constraints) *
1
, Result control 
(setting performance targets) 
 
Action control (Behavioral 
constraints), Result control 
(setting performance targets) 
 
 
Risks related to disputes 
and litigation 
 
  Result control (Define 
performance measures, 
Measurement), Action 
control (Behavioral 
constraints) 
Risks to service 
debasement 
 
  Result control (Define and 
performance measures, 
target setting, measuring 
performance) 
High impact on Cost 
escalation and hidden 
service costs risks 
Result control (measuring 
performance, 
Rewards/Incentives*
1
) 
Result control (measuring 
performance, 
Rewards/Incentives*
1
) 
Result control (measuring 
performance, 
Rewards/Incentives) *
1
 
High impact on loss of 
organizational 
competency risks  
Cultural control (trust), Result 
control (Define and 
performance measures, target 
setting, measuring 
performance, 
Rewards/Incentives*
1
), 
Personal control (training) 
Cultural control (trust), Result 
control (Define and 
performance measures, target 
setting, measuring 
performance, 
Rewards/Incentives*
1
), 
Personal control (training) 
 
 
 
*
1 
Theoretical framework element not discovered as part of empirical study. 
*
2 
Empirical control element not discovered as part of theoretical framework. 
 
5.2 Contradicting elements of the theoretical and empirical evidence and other 
remarkable findings 
This chapter is reviewing the contradicting elements of the theoretical and empirical evidence per 
case and per contradicting element as shown in table 13 Theoretical and empirical synthesis of IT 
services and support activities followed with a review of the other remarkable findings of this 
research.  
IT services case contradicting elements: 
The theoretical framework was expecting the use of rewards and incentives as part of result control 
to counter the risk related to unexpected transition and management costs within the IT Services 
case. The empirical evidence showed an absence of the use of reward and incentives. Teams and 
employees of the supplier within the IT services area are accountable for the performance of their 
work as part of the offshore activities but the outsourcer have no influence on the behavior of the 
suppliers’ teams via reward or incentive systems. Other studies such as the research case from Gopal 
and Gosain (2010, p. 19) show a lack of rewards and incentive programs as part of behavioral 
controls in between and IT service outsourcer and suppliers as part of their empirical evidence and 
highlight the importance of the behavioral controls to improve the performance for the outsourcer 
organization. 
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Within the IT Services case the theoretical framework was not expecting the use of result control and 
governance control to counter the risk related to switching cost. The empirical evidence showed the 
use of multiple suppliers and a mixture of outsourcer resources and supplier resources as part of 
governance control and performance target setting as part of result control. Interviews revealed that 
controlling the risk for switching cost via tight performance measurement is of high importance for 
the IT service activities within the outsourcer organization. The theory from Aubert et al. (2005) 
described this behavior as preventive measurements to avoid high risk of switching cost with the 
supplier #1 but this element of control was not included within the theoretical framework. 
The use of behavioral constraints as part of action control to counter the risk related to costly 
contractual changes within the IT services case was expected by the theoretical framework. However 
the empirical evidence showed an absence of the use of behavioral constraints as there is complete 
focus on target setting and measuring of performance as part of result control rather than the use of 
behavioral constraints to avoid the risk of costly contractual changes within the outsourcer 
organization. 
The theoretical framework was expecting the use of rewards and incentives part of result control to 
counter the risk related to costly contractual changes and the risk related to high impact on loss of 
organizational competency within the IT services case. The empirical evidence showed an absence of 
the use of rewards and incentives as counter measures for both risks between outsourcer 
organization and supplier #1. The cause of the absence have been explained in the risk related to 
unexpected transition and management costs within the IT Services case earlier within this chapter. 
Business processes case contradicting elements: 
The theoretical framework was expecting the use of rewards and incentives as part of result control 
to counter the risk related to unexpected transition and management costs within the business 
processes case. The empirical evidence showed an absence of the use of reward and incentives. 
Teams and employees of the supplier within the IT services area are accountable for the 
performance of their work as part of the offshore activities but the outsourcer have no influence on 
the behavior of the supplier #2 teams via rewards or incentive systems.  
Within the business processes case the theoretical framework was not expecting the use of 
performance target setting part of result control and governance control to counter the risk related 
to switching cost. The empirical evidence showed the use of multiple suppliers and a mixture of 
outsourcer resources and supplier resources as part of governance control and performance target 
setting as part of result control. Interviews revealed that controlling switching cost via tight 
performance measurement is of high importance for the IT service activities within the outsourcer 
organization. The theory from Aubert et al. (2005) described this behavior as preventive 
measurements to avoid high risk of switching cost with the supplier #2 but this element of control 
was not included within the theoretical framework. 
The theoretical framework was expecting the use of rewards and Incentives part of result control to 
counter the risks related to costly contractual changes and the risk related to high impact on loss of 
organizational competency within the business processes case. The empirical evidence showed an 
absence of the use of rewards and incentives as counter measures for both risks between outsourcer 
organization and supplier #2. The cause of the absence have been explained in the risk related to 
unexpected transition and management costs within the IT Services case earlier within this chapter. 
Customer delivery and care case contradicting element: 
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The theoretical framework was expecting the use of rewards and Incentives part of result control to 
counter the risks related to costly contractual changes within the customer delivery and care case. 
The empirical evidence showed an absence of the use of reward and incentives. Teams and 
employees of the supplier within the customer delivery and care area are accountable for the 
performance of their work as part of the offshore activities but the outsourcer have no influence on 
the behavior of the supplier teams via rewards or incentives systems.  
Remarkable findings of the research: 
It is remarkable that the outsourcer organization is not using rewards and incentives as part of result 
control to impact the behavior off any of the three suppliers as each organization, outsourcer and 
suppliers, have  their internal reward and incentives programs. These individual rewards and 
incentive programs are not crossing borders in between outsourcer and supplier organizations. Only 
appreciation emails and letters are allowed in between organization but without financial gains for 
the supplier #1 resources. This can be a context specific phenomenon within the outsourcer 
organization as the outsourcer supplier contract type does not allow for additional payment to 
individuals outside the own organization. However this will require further investigation of the 
theoretical model in a different comparable outsourcer organization to confirm.  
It is also interesting to note that the risk for switching cost have not been identified as a high risk for 
customer delivery and care activity within theoretical framework and as part of the empirical 
evidence. The empirical evidence identified the availability of only one supplier in the customer 
delivery and care activity which is one out of the three factors (1) high asset specificity, (2) small 
number of suppliers and (3) scope factor leading to switching cost risk. The assets specificity has 
been marked as low as part of the empirical evidence but due to the long relationship between the 
outsourcer and the supplier #3 both parties have finetuned the ability to work together. This specific 
coordination between the outsourcer and the supplier #3 to perform the low complex work can be 
seen as a medium or high asset specific activity rather than low as identified by the interviewees. 
This could justify a medium risk for switching cost for the outsourcer instead of the low risk identified 
as part of the theoretical framework and the empirical evidence.  
There is reason to believe as part of speculation instead of hard evidence that the risk for switching 
cost and counter measures for example use of a second supplier have been identified by the supplier 
#3 as they have declined the request for an interview of their direct line manager. The revealing of 
detailed information by the supplier #3 could potentially damage the offshore contract from the 
supplier perspective as they currently have control over the majority of the resources and skills 
within the customer delivery and care activity. 
Cultural control element trust and performance measurements of result control are available as 
controls to counter risk related to switching cost and loss of organizational competence. Empirical 
evidence from the cases showed two perspectives of the balance between the level of trust and 
performance measurements used to counter both risks. The senior management perspective is more 
focused on trust but the lower organization levels are more focus on the performance measurement 
of results by micro management of all results. This can be a context specific phenomenon within the 
outsourcer organization of this research but that will require further investigation of the theoretical 
model in a different comparable outsourcer organization to confirm. 
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6 Conclusion 
The findings of this thesis provides valuable insight into research question, how will management 
control be implemented by an outsourcer to counter different risks for (1) IT service, (2) Business 
process within IT area and (3) customer delivery and care center activities within an offshore 
relationship in the IT sector? The three cases used for this research case within the IT service 
environment are, (1) IT service, (2) Business process within a IT area and (3) customer delivery and 
care center activities as defined within the theoretical framework. In order to provide insight into the 
research question a literature study have been carried out resulting in a theoretical framework. 
Exploratory case study research method was used to conduct an analysis of the offshore 
relationships for the propositions identified within the theoretical framework and collect the 
required information as part of the empirical research.  
Personal interviews with key informants in both outsourcer and supplier organizations have been 
carried out to determine the used management controls to counter different risks within an offshore 
relationship in the IT sector to identify causal relationships. The thesis analysis was carried out on the 
transcripted and pattern matched interview data.  
The three conducted case studies for (1) IT service, (2) Business process within IT area and (3) 
customer delivery and care center activities have shown a high level of similarity between the 
theoretical framework and the empirical evidence based on Table 5 “IT Services and support 
activities management control per risk”. There are also a few contradicting elements between the 
theoretical framework and empirical evidence of this research. 
One of the contradicting element between the theoretical framework and empirical evidence of this 
research is the main drive for result control used by the lower level managers rather than the shared 
focus on both result control elements as well as cultural controls such as trust by the senior 
management layer within the outsourcer organization. 
Another contradicting element of this research is the use of governance control by both the IT 
service case and the business processes case. The governance control method to drive for multiple 
suppliers instead of a single supplier is used to avoid the risk for switching cost by having a single 
supplier. Senior managers in both cases are driving governance control to reduce the risk over time, 
however the IT service activities has secured most of the risk in comparison to the business processes 
activity which show more risks as the business processes activity is still in transition toward their 
ultimate control model whereas the customer delivery and care team is currently working with only 
one supplier. Both should invest more time or should investigate if a second supplier will reduce the 
switching cost risk for their teams. 
Finally, empirical evidence showed that rewards and incentives to influence behavior of supplier 
teams are not used by any of the cases. This can be a context specific phenomenon within the 
outsourcer organization due to contractual restriction between outsourcer and supplier but that will 
require further investigation of the theoretical model in a different comparable outsourcer 
organization to confirm. 
6.1 Limitations and mitigation efforts of this research 
Potential weaknesses of this research strategy were highlighted in chapter 3.4 Methodological 
quality. In order to prevent these weaknesses the following actions have been taken to ensure the 
quality of the research as part of construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability. 
Construct validity issues have been mitigated by use of reviewed interviews results by the key 
informants, triangulation through verifying cases from more than one interviewee within the same 
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activity and using the same key variables and definitions from the literature within the structure 
questions creation, interviews and analysis. Internal validity issues have been mitigated by informing 
interviewees about the key variables and definitions of the research prior to the interview in order to 
allow them to prepare to provide relevant information. External validity issues have been mitigated 
by selecting interviewees that where either in a key management role or close to that role impacting 
on the offshore relationship between the West European outsourcer and Asian suppliers in an IT 
sector in line context description of the research questions. Reliability issues have been mitigated by 
rigorous documentation of the research process and rationale behind research strategy choices as 
explained in chapter 3.3 Data collection and analysis.  
There are a few limitation with this research case. The theoretical framework of this thesis did not 
distinguish the types of offshore contract as part of the model. The empirical evidence of this 
research have identified two types of offshore contracts, materials and resources contract type or 
fixed price contract type, in use within the outsourcer organization. Further research will be required 
to include the offshore contract type within theoretical framework or limit the cases on a specific 
offshore contract type. 
Another limitation of this research is that the used theoretical framework is only assessed within 
limited number of Asian suppliers for one West European outsourcer organization as identified 
within the research question. Therefor the value of the theoretical framework used within the 
research case will not be fully assessed until it is tested on other IT organizations fitting the profile as 
defined within the research question. This will improve the external validity of the theoretical 
framework used within the research case.   
Due to risk of disclosure of business critical information and the risk of jeopardizing the offshore 
contract supplier #3 have chosen not to participate in the interviews, limiting the triangulation of the 
interview data as part of the construct validation of this thesis.  
6.2 Topics for further research 
The following topics where identified as possible starting points for further research. 
Firstly the research did not completely work out the differences in view on controlling offshore risks 
between the vice president level and the senior/line manager level from a theoretical framework 
perspective. Future research could be aimed at the understanding of the role of the different 
perspective between vice top level and lower level management in controlling offshore risks via 
management controls in more details. 
Secondly the empirical research revealed two types of offshore contracts. IT service activity supplier 
# 1 and customer delivery and care supplier #3 are currently based on materials and resources 
offshore contract and business processes supplier # 2 is using a fixed prices for service offshore 
contract. Further investigation is required to understand the impact of these contract types in 
controlling offshore risks via management controls in more details and find out if there are other 
contract types in use for offshoring IT service activities. 
From the interviews held within all three cases, it emerged that the action control elements reward 
and incentive are not use within the outsourcer contract to improve the behavior or performance of 
the supplier resources. This means that the outsourcer is not able to positively improve the 
performance of individuals within the supplier organizations. It is my believe that these aspects of 
supplier resource reward and incentive can add value within the outsourcer organization. Further 
investigation is required to understand what impact rewards can have on the offshore risk as part of 
the action controls for an IT service offshoring contract.    
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6.3 Practical implication of the research case 
The findings of this research case provides valuable inside into how different management controls 
are used by line management and senior management of the outsourcer organization to counter the 
different offshore risks between the West European outsourcer organization and the Asian suppliers 
within an offshore contract.  
One of the main conclusions of this research is the absence of rewards and incentives programs 
between the outsourcer organization and the supplier organization as part of a offshoring contract. 
The outsourcer and suppliers internally use rewards and incentives programs to improve the 
behavior of their resources but due to contractual constraints there are no rewards and incentives 
programs crossing borders from the outsourcer in to the supplier organizations. The outsourcer 
organization should invest effort in additional supplier rewards and incentives to improve the 
behavior of supplier and supplier resources and ultimately improve the performance of the 
outsourcer organization. 
It was also found as part of the empirical evidence that the outsourcer organization work with two 
different views on controlling offshore risks. Research showed a mixed use of result and cultural 
control elements to control offshore risks between the senior management level and the lowest line 
manager level within the outsourcer organization. In order to avoid confusion and mismatch in the 
way to control offshore risks it would be beneficial to the outsourcer organization as a whole to align 
the management controls in more details on all management levels.  
Empirical evidence showed different approaches used by the three cases in the amount of suppliers 
contracted to carry out the offshore activities. The IT service and business processes teams make use 
of governance control to avoid having a low number of suppliers within their offshore contract 
whereas the customer delivery and care team only make use of one supplier in their offshore 
contract. Not only is it advisable to use a second supplier to reduce business risk for the outsourcer 
organization. It is also good to align the suppliers in size and expertise as shown within the IT service 
activities. The business processes team should try to balance the size and expertise of the two 
suppliers over time and the customer delivery and care team should investigate options to introduce 
a second supplier for the offshore contract to reduce their business risk on a single supplier.  
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Appendix A Questionnaire 
This questionnaire is part of the case study research as part of the Open Universiteit master thesis 
theme Management Control to counter different risks within strategy offshore relationship between 
organizations in the IT sector. The questions have been structured per subject: initially some general 
questions will be asked to establish context of interviewee in following with questions that focus on 
the Contact/Contract phase (chapter 3), Execution phase (chapter 4) ending with the Outcome phase 
(chapter 5). The interviews will be held via Skype session and recorded. When finished and processed 
the interviewee will be offered a first view into the notes and possibility for adjustments and/or 
corrections. Please take note that the Questionnaire will be adjusted per interview to focus on the 
specific company. Furthermore all names will be removed from the thesis.   
1. General 
What is your name? 
What is your function?  
Can you give a short description of the company and department you work for?  
 
2. Offshore relationship  
Can you describe your role in the organization and how you are connected/involved within an 
offshore relationship with either (1) IT service, (2) business process within an IT area or (3) customer 
delivery and care activities?  
What were the motivations to use and offshore relationship within the context of this activity?  
How would you describe the activities currently carried out by the offshore partner?  
Can you describe if uncertainty can impact the correct execution of the offshored activities?  
 
3. Asset specificity 
Can you describe the level of knowledge share necessary from the outsourcer in to the agent required 
as part of the transition of the work from the outsourcer in to agent organization and do you have 
examples?  
How would you describe the activities carried out by the agent, outsourcer company specific or 
industry specific and if so do you have examples why? 
How many other agent organizations can provide similar type resources for these outsource 
activities?  
Can you describe the level of knowledge and skill required to carry out these activities and can you 
give examples why?  
Do you regard the agents contribution as unique and why?   
 
4. Uncertainty 
Can you describe the IT technology used within the outsourced activities and in what stage of the 
technology lifecycle this is?  
 Do you experience frequent change of requirements and can you give examples how this will impact 
the work carried out?  
   
5. General use of Management control in organization 
5.1 Result control  
What are the  main measurement drivers for or a successful offshore relationship?  
To what extent are rewards (gain sharing, bonus) based on personal  performance used within the 
offshore contract?  
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How accountable are the agents employees and management for favorable outcomes for the 
outsourcer in the offshore relationship?  
How effective can results be measured within the offshore relationship?  
 
5.2 Action control  
Which restraining activities are being put on employees to prevent behavior that can harm the 
outsourcer? For examples of physical constraints, administrative constraints or separation of duties.  
To what extent are employees being held accountable for actions taken? Actions resulting from  rules, 
procedures, work instructions. Are there any rewards or punishments connected in not following 
these procedures?  
Are any tasks being performed double (redundant) for the purpose of increasing the probability that it 
will be successfully fulfilled?  
 
5.3 Personnel control 
What importance is placed on the selection of the right key employee in the offshore relationship? 
Reference checks? Education experience? Past success (track record) social skills?  
How is the employee selection of personnel in the offshore relationship done?   
What is the effort and intensity of training for employees and staff in the offshore relationship?   
 
5.4 Cultural control 
Is there a specific culture 'way of doing'  within  the offshore relationship? Is this culture different than 
within the outsourcer organization? 
How well would you describe the agents ability to provide results and keep promises?  
How would you describe the outsourcer control on the offshore relationship, result control driven and 
measured or based on trust or a combination? Can you explain why?  
 
6.  General offshoring risk  
6.1 Unexpected transition and management costs 
Can you describe the level of experience displayed by the agent and is that in line with the expected 
level? How can you control this if it is causing issues?  
How would you describe the level of outsourcing experience of the agent within the offshore 
relationship?  
Are there uncertainty about the legal environment in which the agent is carrying out the activities and 
if so can you provide examples? How can you control this if it is causing issues?  
 
 
6.2 Switching costs  
How would you describe the level of asset specificity of the offshore activities? How can you control 
this if it is causing issues?  
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How many suppliers are currently able to perform the offshore activities and do you have other 
alternatives available beside the current listed agents? How can you control this if it is causing issues?  
Can you identify specific scope or skills only accessible through one supplier and do you have 
examples? How can you control this if it is causing issues?  
 
6.3 Costly contractual 
Do technological shortfall and discontinuity by agents impact on the existing offshore contracts?  
How can you control this if it is causing issues?  
How do task complexity impact on the activities carried out by agents? Can this lead to changes 
within the offshore contract? How can you control this if it is causing issues?   
 
 
6.4 Disputes and litigation 
How would you describe the level of outsourcing experience of the agent within the offshore 
relationship?  
Are there uncertainty about the legal environment in which the agent is carrying out the activities and 
if so can you provide examples? How can you control this if it is causing issues?  
How would potential cultural differences between outsourcer and agents negatively impact the 
offshore relationship and do you have examples currently causing issues? How can you control this if 
it is causing issues?  
 
 
6.5 Service debasement 
How would you describe the level of experience and expertise of the supplier with the activity?  
How can outsourcer check if the agent are able to provide sustainable size of resources to perform the 
offshore work?  
How would you qualify the financial stability and the level of work interruptions of the agent 
organization?  
How would you mark the task complexity carried out by the agent?  
 
6.6 Cost escalation and hidden service costs 
Can describe factors currently leading to outsourcer escalation as result of lack of experience and 
expertise of the agent with contract management? Do you see these happen more or less compared 
to activities carried out by own organization?  
Can you describe which uncertainty within an offshore relationship can cause escalation activities and 
additional time and effort spend by the outsourcer organization?  
How are offshore activities measured performance wise? How will you avoid potential measurement 
problems between outsourcer and agent?  
Are there escalation as a result of low level of experience and expertise of the supplier with the 
activity?  
 
6.7 Loss of organizational competency 
How well can the outsourcer perform the scope and skills required for the activities?  
Can you describe if the loss of competence and talent within the outsourcer organization will make 
the outsourcer organization vulnerable and why?   
How are you controlling the geographical distance between the outsourcer and agent to avoid loss of 
competency within the outsourcer organization?  
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Appendix B Analysis synthesis 
Table 15: 
Theoretical and empirical synthesis of IT Services and support activities 
 IT Services Business Processes Customer delivery and care 
centers 
 Activity examples   
Theoretical framework:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Empirical evidence: 
 
Application testing  
Software development 
Content development 
Engineering and design 
Product optimization 
 
 
[Design activity] √ 
Transaction processing 
Accounts processing 
Customer administration 
Data processing  
Quality assurance 
 
 
[Business processing] √ 
Help desk 
Delivery support/advice 
Technical support/advice 
Customer Support/advice 
Customer relations 
management ` 
Employee inquiries 
[Delivery support] √ 
 
 
Theoretical framework: 
Empirical evidence: 
 
 Asset specificity 
High 
[Very high] √ 
  
Medium  
[Medium/High] √ 
 
Low  
[Low] √ 
 
 
Theoretical framework: 
Empirical evidence: 
 
 
Uncertainty 
High uncertainty 
[High uncertainty] √ 
 
 
medium uncertainty 
[Medium uncertainty] √ 
 
 
Low uncertainty 
[Medium uncertainty] X 
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Table 16: 
Theoretical and empirical synthesis of components of IT outsourcing risk exposer.  
Undesirable 
outcomes 
Factors leading to 
outcome 
 IT Service
 
   B
u
sin
e
ss 
p
ro
cesse
s 
  C
u
sto
m
er 
d
elivery 
an
d
 care 
Unexpected 
transition and 
management 
costs 
- Lack of experience 
and expertise of the 
agent with the 
activity 
- Lack of experience of 
the agent with 
Outsourcing 
- Uncertainty about 
the legal 
environment 
 
 
 
 
   √ 
 
 
 
 
Switching costs - Asset specificity 
- Small number of 
suppliers 
- Scope 
- Interdependence of 
activities 
√ 
√/x 
√ 
   √/x 
   √/x 
   √ 
 
   
   √ 
 
 
Costly 
contractual 
- Uncertainly 
- Technological 
discontinuity 
- Task complexity 
√ 
 
√ 
   √/x 
 
   √ 
   √/x 
 
Disputes and 
litigation 
- Lack of experience 
and expertise of the 
agent and/or the 
supplier with 
Outsourcing 
contracts 
- Uncertainly about 
the legal 
environment 
- Poor cultural fit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Service 
debasement 
- Interdependence of 
activities 
- Lack of experience 
and expertise of the 
supplier with the 
activity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   √ 
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- Supplier size 
- Supplier financial 
instability 
- Task complexity 
 
 
√ 
    
 
   √/x 
 
Cost escalation 
and hidden 
service costs 
- Lack of experience 
and expertise of the 
agent with contract 
management 
- Uncertainty 
- Measurement 
problems 
- Lack of experience 
and expertise of the 
supplier with the 
activity Complexity of 
the activities 
 
 
 
√ 
 
 
 
 
 
   √/x 
 
 
   √/x 
 
   √/x 
 
 
 
 
   √/x 
 
 
Loss of 
organizational 
competency 
- Scope of the 
activities 
- Proximity to the core 
competency 
√ 
 
   √/x 
 
 
     
√:  Factor available 
√/x:  Factor partly available 
  
61 
 
  
62 
 
  
 
Appendix C Literature 
Aubert, B. A., Patry, M., & Rivard, S. (2005). A framework for information technology outsourcing risk 
management. ACM SIGMIS Database, 36(4), 9-28.  
Bahli, B., & Rivard, S. (2003). The information technology outsourcing risk: a transaction cost and 
agency theory-based perspective. Journal of Information Technology, 18(3), 211-221. 
doi:10.1080/0268396032000130214 
Bhalla, A., Sodhi, M. S., & Son, B.-G. (2008). Is more IT offshoring better?: An exploratory study of 
western companies offshoring to South East Asia. Journal of Operations Management, 26(2), 
322-335.  
Ding, R., Dekker, H. C., & Groot, T. (2013). Risk, partner selection and contractual control in interfirm 
relationships. Management Accounting Research, 24(2), 140-155.  
Gibbert, M., & Ruigrok, W. (2010). The" what" and" how" of case study rigor: Three strategies based 
on published research. Organizational Research Methods.  
Gilbert, X. a. S., P. (1989). From innovation to outpacing. Business Quarterly, Summer, 19-22.  
Gopal, A., & Gosain, S. (2010). Research note—The role of organizational controls and boundary 
spanning in software development outsourcing: Implications for project performance. 
Information Systems Research, 21(4), 960-982.  
Hahn, E. D., Bunyaratavej, K., & Doh, J. P. (2011). Impacts of risk and service type on nearshore and 
offshore investment location decisions. Management International Review, 51(3), 357-380.  
Kamminga, P. E., & Van der Meer-Kooistra, J. (2007). Management control patterns in joint venture 
relationships: A model and an exploratory study. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
32(1), 131-154.  
Khan, N., Currie, W. L., Weerakkody, V., & Desai, B. (2003). Evaluating offshore IT outsourcing in 
India: supplier and customer. Paper presented at the System Sciences, 2003. Proceedings of 
the 36th Annual Hawaii International Conference on. 
Meira, J., Cullen, J., Tsamenyi*, M., Kartalis, N. D., Tsamenyi, M., & Cullen, J. (2010). Management 
controls and inter-firm relationships: a review. Journal of Accounting & Organizational 
Change, 6(1), 149-169.  
Merchant, K. A., & Van der Stede, W. A. (2012). Management control systems: performance 
measurement, evaluation and incentives: Pearson Education. 
Michaeva, D. (2010). Managing Performance of the Offshored Services.  
Nicholson, B., Jones, J., & Espenlaub, S. (2006). Transaction costs and control of outsourced 
accounting: Case evidence from India. Management Accounting Research, 17(3), 238-258.  
Parmigiani, A., & Rivera-Santos, M. (2011). Clearing a path through the forest: A meta-review of 
interorganizational relationships. Journal of Management, 37(4), 1108-1136.  
Poppo, L., & Zenger, T. (2002). Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes 
or complements? Strategic management journal, 23(8), 707-725.  
Saunders, M., Lewis, P., & Thornhill, A. (2012). Research methods for business students, 6: Pearson 
Education India. 
Speklé, R. F. (2001). Explaining management control structure variety: a transaction cost economics 
perspective. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 26(4), 419-441.  
Stack, M., & Downing, R. (2005). Another look at offshoring: Which jobs are at risk and why? Business 
Horizons, 48(6), 513-523.  
Stratman, J. K. (2008). Facilitating offshoring with enterprise technologies: Reducing operational 
friction in the governance and production of services. Journal of Operations Management, 
26(2), 275-287.  
63 
 
Tafti, M. H. A. (2005). Risks factors associated with offshore IT outsourcing. Industrial Management & 
Data Systems, 105(5), 549-560. doi:doi:10.1108/02635570510599940 
Williamson, O. E. (1973). Markets and hierarchies: some elementary considerations. The American 
economic review, 63(2), 316-325.  
Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies: analysis and antitrust implications: a study in the 
economics of internal organization. New York, 26-29.  
Williamson, O. E. (1979). Transaction-cost economics: the governance of contractual relations. The 
journal of law & economics, 22(2), 233-261.  
Yin, R. (2003). K.(2003). Case study research: Design and methods. Sage Publications, Inc, 5, 11.  
 
